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Until the past decade or so, economists tended to believe that the deter-
minants of fertility are largely noneconomic or, at least, that the analysis
of fertility is outside the scope of economic theory.1 In part, these beliefs
This is a substantially revised version of a paper of the same title, which, in its
earlier form, is the first chapter of my University of Washington Ph.D. dissertation.
I have accrued a substantial debt to too many individuals who have contributed to
the evolution of the ideas in this paper to acknowledge them all individually. I would
like especially to thank John Floyd, who first suggested to me that economic analysis
might be applied to population, Jon Rasmussen, who contributed importantly to the
mathematical development of the paper, and Warren Sanderson, whose contribution
to my thinking on fertility behavior is so ubiquitous thatI can only reluctantly
absolve him from responsibility for any errors or inadequacies in this paper. My debt
to Yoram Ben-Porath will be apparent from his paper in this book. T. W. Schultz,
Gary Becker, and H. Gregg Lewis made valuable suggestions for improving the final
draft of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the excellent research and pro-
gramming assistance of C. Ates Dagli. Work on this paper was supported by a Ford
Foundation grant to the National Bureau of Economic Research, for study of the
economics of population. Earlier,I was aided by a Ford Foundation dissertation
fellowship and by Wesleyan University.
1Becker(1960) argued that fertility could be analyzed within an economic frame-
work. He emphasized the connection between income and fertility which he believed
to be positive under conditions in which birth control knowledge was equalized across
income classes. He also distinguished, importantly, between the cost and quality of
children, arguing that the latter but not the former is subject to parental choice. This
distinction remains a matter of controversy. Efforts were made in the sixties to investi-
gate empirically the relationship between income and fertility over time and cross-
sectionally, with mixed results in the sense that income did not seem to have a
consistent positive or negative effect on fertility, nor did the magnitude of the effect
of income seem to be large(see, e.g., Adelman 1963; Freedman 1963; Silver1965,
1966; Freedman and Coombs 1966a, 1966b; Friedlander and Silver 1967; Easterlin
1968, 1969). Mincer (1963)shifted the emphasis of the economic approach from
income effects to the effects on fertility of variation in the cost of children by showing
that the opportunity cost of the wife's time as measured by the wife's wage rate was
negatively related to fertility. The allocation of time between home and market and
within the home was also discussed by Mincer (1962a), and a formal theory of time
allocation was provided by Becker (1965). Becker's theory of time allocation has
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were fostered because the neo-Malthusian proposition that increases in
income tend to stimulate fertility conflicted with the facts that income
growth has been accompanied by secular decline of fertility and that family
income is inversely associated with cross-section fertility differentials in
the industrialized countries.2
More fundamentally, economists have neglected fertility behavior be-
cause it has been difficult to incorporate it rigorously into the traditional
theory of consumer choice. Recent extensions of economic theory to cope
with human capital, allocation of time, and nonmarket household behavior
now make possible the analysis of fertility as well as other traditionally
demographic, sociological, and bio-medical aspects of behavior such as
marriage, divorce, birth control, child-rearing practices, schooling, and
health along with more conventional economic variables such as income,
consumption, saving, and labor-force behavior within a unified choice-
theoretic framework.
This framework might be called the "economic theory of the family."
In it, the family is treated as a complex social institution in which the
interdependent and overlapping life-cycle behavior of family members and
the family unit as a whole is determined by the interaction of the prefer-
ences and capacities of its members with the social and economic environ-
ment they face currently and expect to face in the future. Clearly, no
single tractable, intelligible, or testable model of the full range of family
life-cycle behavior is yet feasible. At best, the present state of the economic
theory of the family provides a framework within which a large class of
models may be developed and their implications tested against one another
as well as against hypotheses derived from other, more comprehensive
theoretical frameworks.
I present a static economic theory of lifetime marital fertility within
the context of this new economic approach to family behavior. The theo-
retical model is developed under a set of restrictive assumptions designed
to make it analytically tractable and capable of yielding implications
which may be tested with individual data on the number of children
born to recent cohorts of American women who have completed their
fertility. The model also has implications for child "quality," which is
heavily influenced models of fertility, child quality, and related aspects of household
behavior by T. P. Schultz (1969), Nerlove and Schultz (1970), and Sanderson and
Willis (1971), as well as a number of unpublished studies. Empirical tests in these
studies lend support to Mincer's finding that increases in the cost of the wife's time
tend to reduce fertility while the effect of income is more problematic.
2 After World War II many of these countries experienced an upswing infer-
tility which, in the United States, is known as the postwar "baby boom," The U.S.
birth rate peaked in 1957 and has followed a declining path since then to a current
level lower than the previous minimum reach in the 1930s. The inverse association of
income and cross-section fertility differentials also changed in the postwar period to
a more U-shaped pattern in which the fertility of the middle-income classes tends to
be lower than that of either the lowest or highest classes.
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defined as a function of the resources parents devote to each child, and
for the wife's lifetime market earnings capacity and labor supply.
1.Fertility as a Form of Economic Behavior
A number of characteristics of fertility behavior have made it difficult to
analyze fertility within a choice-theoretic framework:(1) Childbearing
and child rearing are nonmarket activities in which there are few trans-
action prices to provide information to the outside observer about the cost
of children to suppliers or the value of children to suppliers. Parents are
both demanders and suppliers of children. (2) Children and competing
household activities both require the expenditure of parental time in addi-
tion to money. (3) The parental obligation to a child tends to be a long-
term one, extending, sometimes, beyond the parents' lifetimes. (4) The
wide variation of parental expenditures of time and money on bearing
and rearing children observed from family to family and culture to culture
suggests that the parents' obligations to children do not entail an exoge-
nously determined program of expenditures per child. Rather, within the
scope of laws and mores, parents may exercise considerable discretion in
their expenditures in an attempt to shape the characteristics and activities
of children in accordance with parental desires. The concept of the cost
of children contains unavoidable ambiguity unless discretionary expendi-
tures on what may be termed "child quality" are explicitly included in
the analysis. (5) The motives for having children may include both the
direct satisfaction children are expected to provide their parents and the
indirect satisfaction they may render by working in the household or
family business or by remitting money income to their parents. Thus,
fertility is motivated by consumption, saving, or investment considera-
tions.(6) Parents cannot exercise direct control over the number and
timing of children they will bear and rear to maturity. A couple may only
attempt to influence the monthly probability of conception and, given
conception, the probability that a pregnancy will terminate in a live birth.
Similarly, the probability of survival of a child will depend on choices made
by parents as well as on environmental conditions outside their control.
Imperfect fertility control and child mortality and morbidity pose addi-
tional constraints on family fertility behavior and add further dimensions
to family choice. (7) Finally, there are difficulties in defining the appro-
priate unit of analysis. Decisions to have children and decisions concerning
age at marriage and the characteristics and preferences of the marital part-
ners are closely intertwined. Moreover, as children mature, they may
have an independent effect on family decisions.
The principal problem to be resolved in analyzing fertility as a form
of economic behavior is how to define conceptually satisfactory measures
of the costs and satisfactions of children to their parents in a manner28 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
consistent with the distinctive characteristics of fertility behavior just
listed. The required measure of cost is one that corresponds to the con-
cept of opportunity cost, that is, the value to parents of the opportunities
foregone in having an additional child; and the required concept of satis-
faction is one that specifies the characteristics of children that give rise
to utility.
In order to focus on these problems in the simplest possible context,
the theoretical model presented here abstracts from the sequential and
stochastic nature of the family's economic and demographic life cycle.
A one-period comparative static framework will be used in which a hus-
band and wife of given ages and characteristics are considered to adopt,
at the outset of marriage, a utility-maximizing lifetime plan for child-
bearing, for expenditures of time and money on children, and for other
sources of parental satisfaction not related to children. The utility func-
tion being maximized reflects the tastes and preferences ofall family
members as they are taken into account by the husband and wife, who
are assumed to make all family decisions. The couple will be assumed to
have perfect and costless control over their fertility and to possess perfect
foresight concerning all relevant demographic and economic variables over
the course of their marriage, so that the lifetime plan adopted ex ante at
marriage coincides with ex post observations of their completed fertility.
The new approach to consumer theory suggested by Lancaster (1966)
and especially the pioneering work of Becker, Mincer, and others on the
allocation of time and human capital provide a theoretical framework
within which the costs and satisfactions of children to their parents may
be formulated in a more satisfactory way than is possible within the con-
ventional theory of consumer choice.3 Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966)
argue that a family's utility is not received directly from its consumption
of market goods or leisure, as it is in conventional models. Instead, Becker
assumes that the family combines time supplied by family members with
goods and services purchased in the market to produce within the house-
hold the more basic "commodities" which are the true objects of utility.
For example, rather than assume that medical care is purchased because it
yields satisfaction directly, it may be assumed that medical care along with
other purchased goods and services, the individual's own time, and the
time of other family members combine to produce the commodity "good
health," which is the actual source of utility.4
In general, family utility is considered to be a function of a vector
of nonmarketable, home-produced commodities such as good health, enter-
tainment, nutrition, and, as Iwill suggest, satisfaction from children.
For a survey of the application of these ideas to a variety of problems in the field
of human resources, see T. W. Schultz (1972a).
See Grossman (1972a) for an application of this analysis to the demand for health.
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This utilityfunction, whose propertiesreflectthefamily'stastesor
preferences, is defined by Becker on the n vector of commodities Z and
may be written as
U(Z)Z=(Z,)i=1,...,n. (1)
It is assumed that the family will behave as ifit attempts to maximize
(1) subject to its limited capacity to produce Z,.
The validity ofthis assumption has been discussed by Samuelson
(1956). In general terms, a family may be regarded as a collection of
individuals whose common welfare is a function of the utility of each of
its v members so that in place of (1) we may write a Bergson-Samuelson
"family welfare function" of the form
W=W(Ul,Us,...,Uv), (2)
where the Ui(j =1,..., v)is the level of utility of family member j.
Assumingthat the family attempts to maximize W, that=
and that
zi=
Samuelson proved that the family will behave as if it were an individual
attempting to maximize (1). The condition U' implies that an
individual family member's utility is independent of the level of utility
of any other family member, and the condition
zi=
meansthat an additional unit of Z allocated to family member jmustbe
subtracted from the consumption of other family members. Thus, Samuel-
son's proof that a family may be treated as if it were an individual maxi-
mizing a utility function such as (1) assumes no interdependency in utility
among family members and no jointness in consumption.
But these are precisely the factors most responsible for the existence of
the family as the predominant social institution in which individuals live.
As Samuelson wrote-(1956, pp. 9—10):
Where the family is concerned the phenomenon of altruism in-
evitably raises its head: if we can speak at all of the indifference
curves of any one member, we must admit that his tastes and
marginal rates of substitution are contaminated by the goods
that other members consume. These Veblen-Duesenberry ex-
ternal consumption effects are the essence of family life. They
require us to build up an interpersonal theory that sounds more'
like welfare economics than like positive demand analysis. Such
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of the same logical character as the general problem of govern-
ment and social welfare.
Samuelson's emphasis can be reversed, however. The family exists as
an institution because, given altruism and the nonmarket mechanisms by
which it is able to allocate commodities and welfare among its members, it
has both the incentive and the capacity to resolve allocative problems
involving public goods, externalities, and the like that in impersonal mar-
kets inevitably lead to market imperfections. The capacity of the family
to resolve these problems efficiently provides a basis for a positive theory
of family behavior, because, given efficient allocation, the family will
tend to respond systematically to changes in the position or shape of the
constraints it faces. Consequently, for many purposes, it may be assumed,
as it is in this paper, that the family behaves as ifitis attempting to
maximize a utility function of the type in (1).
It is assumed in Becker's model that each of the commodities Z,is
produced according to a household production function with inputs of an
m vector of market goods and services, x, and vector of time inputs, t,,






The properties of these household production functions may be said to
be determined by the state of the family's consumption technology in
exactly the same sense that the properties of conventional production func-
tions of firms are said to be determined by the state of standard produc-
tion technology.
it is natural, within this framework, to consider those characteristics
of children that provide satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) to their parents
as commodities produced with time and goods according to household
production functions. The relevant dimensions of child characteristics and
the processes by which parents may alter them are inherently complex
matters about which there is much ignorance (especially among parents).
Fortunately, the traditions of economics permit the economic actors to
solve the difficult problems.
In this spirit, it is assumed that a couple may choose to bear up to
a maximum of N children and that the vector of utility-generating charac-
teristics of a given child may be aggregated into the commodity which
will be called the "quality" of the ith child. Each child's quality is pro-
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whereandare, respectively, vectors of purchased goods and family
members' time devoted to the ith child.5
It is assumed that the marginal products of time and goods in the pro-
duction of arepositive but diminishing and that the ith child is born if
Q1>0and is averted if Q,=0, where the index i indicates the order of
birth. The production functions for child quality imply that the parents
may increase the satisfaction they derive from a given child by increasing
the resources devoted to the child and that a given level of child quality
may be obtained with alternative combinations of time and goods. The
efficient or least-cost input combination will depend on the relative prices
of time of individual family members and on the relative prices of market
goods and services.
As specified in (4), the production functions for child quality need not
be the same across birth orders. For example, the "technology" of pro-
ducing child quality in the first child may differ from that appropriate
to the second child because of interactions between the children, because
parents may apply lessons learned from the first child to rearing the
second child, or because some inputs are jointly productive for both chil-
dren. Heterogeneity in technology implies that for a given set of input
prices, the marginal costs of augmenting the maydiffer and that there
will tend to be changes in their relative costs with respect to changes in
relative input prices. This formulation also allows the Q,tobe imperfect
substitutes or complements for one another in consumption, assuming that
they enter as separate arguments into the family utility function. The
effect of changes in the prices of time and goods or in the total resources
of the family would, in general, result in changes in the input mix used
to produce child quality, changes in the relative and absolute levels of
quality of each child, and, most important from the standpoint of this
study, changes in the number of children born.
The advantages of this rather general and flexible formulation of the
problem of child quality are, for the purposes at hand, outweighed by the
disadvantages of its analytical complexity and the lack of data necessary
to place appropriate restrictions on the production functions for child
quality or to test the implications of intuitively plausible restrictions. An
analytically simpler specification which will prove to have testable implica-
tionsis derived, given the following assumptions:(1)the production
5 This concept of child quality need bear no connection with an outsider's judgment
of the physical, intellectual, or personal characteristics of higher-quality compared with
lower-quality children;it merely reflects the parents' judgment about the optimal
quantity of resources to be devoted to each child. This disclaimer does not rule out
the possibility that parents do affect the characteristics of their children or that child
characteristics are unrelated to child quality. Indeed, an investigation of the connection
between resources devoted to children and child characteristics would seem amply
justified on empirical grounds (see, e.g., Wray 1971) and in terms of its relevance for
the implications of policies designed to affect fertility. Some work in this direction
has been done already by De Tray (1972o).32 ROBERTJ. WILLIS THEORY OF FERTILITY
functions for child quality, f',arelinearly homogeneous and identical, (2)
there is no joint production of child quality,6 and (3) parents choose an
equal level of child quality for each child born.
Under these assumptions, the production function for the quality per
child, Q,maybe written as the linearly homogeneous function
Q =f(t,,/N,xe/N), (5)
whereandare, respectively, the vectors of the total amount of time
and goods devoted to all children during the parents' lifetime and N is the
total number of children born, so that ta/N and xe/N are the amount of
time and goods devoted to each child. Multiplying (3) by N, we may write
C = NQ=/ (ta, (6)
where C, the total amount of child quality, will be called "child services."7
It is assumed that N and Qenteras separate arguments into the family
utility function.
In addition to utility derived from the number and quality of children,
parents derive satisfaction from many other sources. These other sources
of satisfaction which are unrelated to the number and quality of children
will be expressed as the aggregate commodity, S, which is assumed to be
produced according to the following linearly homogeneous household pro-
duction function:
S =g(t8,x8), (7)
where t8 and x, are, respectively, vectors of time and goods devoted to S
production. It is assumed that inputs to S do not jointly produce child
quality. It should be noted that S embodies all sources of satisfaction to
the husband and wife other than those arising from their children. Thus,
the family utility function, which is written as
U= U(N,Q,S), (8)
is a function of the number and quality of children as well as the parents'
other sources of satisfaction.
The level of utility the family may achieve is limited by its capacity
to produce C (=NQ)and S. Given its state of consumption technology
as embodied in the properties of household production functions, the pro-
6 There is joint production if a unit of time or goods devoted to the production of
Q4 simultaneously increases or decreases the output of Q1 (ji).See Grossman (1971)
for a theoretical analysis of joint.production in the household.
7 A multiplicative treatment of quality-quantity relationships similar to that specified
in eq. (6) is given, in the general case, by Theil (1952) and, for children, by Becker
(1960). Neither, however, used the concept of a household production function as
a basis for the relationship, nor did they consider time inputs. The more complex
specification involving separate production functions for each child was adopted by
Sanderson in a life-cycle model of fertility described in Sanderson and Willis (1971.
pp. 34—42).
ductive capacity of th(
and goods. The model i
husband and wife
only the wife's time is
relative market prices
modity theorem may b
gate good, x, with a
Under these assum
limited by its lifetime
which, in turn, is equa
time market earnings
is assumed unproducth
time" in the market
family's nonlabor wea
income or wealth, H,
family'slifetime inconi
where w is the
the number of hours
amount of the wife's d
life-spanafter
L.Thus,the time coni
where T is considered
Since joint producti
goods or the wife's tia
S production so that
and
where x,. and teare
inputs of goods and
tively, the time intern
The structure of th
It is assumed, in oti
their parents. The lifetir
goods devoted to them
quality (see De Tray 197ROBERTJ. WILLIS
Leous and identical, (2)
(3) parents choose an
n for the quality per
us function
(5)
total amount of time
lifetime and N is the
N are the amount of
by N, we may write
(6)
lied "child services."7
ments into the family
d quality of children,
These other sources
d quality of children
ich is assumed to be
neous household pro-
(7)
goods devoted to S
jointly produce child
ces of satisfaction to
their children. Thus,
(8)
well as the parents'
iited by its capacity
sumption technology
functions, the pro-
to the production of
). See Grossman (1971)
similar to that specified
for children, by Becker
production function as
its. The more complex
child was adopted by
and Willis (1971.
THEORY OF FERTILITY BEHAVIOR 33
ductive capacity of the family is limited by its lifetime supplies of time
and goods. The model is further simplified by assuming (1) that only the
husband and wife contribute market earnings to family income,8 (2) that
only the wife's time is productive at borne, and (3) that the structure of
relative market prices remains fixed, so that the Hicks composite com-
modity theorem may be used to justify treating goods inputs as an aggre-
gate good, x, with a price index, p.
Under these assumptions, the family's input of purchased goodsis
limited by its lifetime money income (or money wealth),
Y= px, (9)
which, in turn, is equal to the sum of its nonlabor wealth, V, and the life-
time market earnings of the husband and wife. Since the husband's time
is assumed unproductive at home, he will have an incentive to work "full
time" inthe market during marriage. His lifetime earnings and the
family's nonlabor wealth together will be called the husband's lifetime
income or wealth, H, and will be treated as an exogenous variable. The
family's lifetime income and expenditure equation may be written as
VH +wL= px, (10)
where w is the average hourly market wage received by the wife and L is
the number of hours she works in the labor market during marriage. The
amount of the wife's time available for home production, t, is equal to her
life-span after marriage, T, minus (marital) lifetime hours of market work,
L. Thus, the time constraint may be written
T =t+L, (11)
where T is considered exogenous.
Since joint production of C and S is ruled out, it follows that a unit of
goods or the wife's time devoted to C production must be subtracted from
S production so that
and
x =tx,,
t = +=pcXc +p,,Xs,
(12)
(13)
whereandare inputs of goods and time to children, z, and t, are
inputs of goods and time to S, and tr/Xcand t,x3 are, respec-
tively, the time intensities of C and S production.
The structure of the model is completed by considering the determinants
8is assumed, in other words, that children do not remit any money income to
their parents. The lifetime earnings of children, which depend partly on the time and
goods devoted to them by their parents, may be considered as a component of child
quality (see De Tray 1972a).° Compared with males, relatively littleis known about the effects of investment
in human capital on the market (or nonmarket) productivity of females, particularly
in the post school and postmarital phases of the life cycle. Empirically, the life-cycle
profile of male wage rates, particularly better-educated males, tends torise quite
steeply with age while the life-cycle profile of married women's wages tend to be
much flatter, even for college-educated women. Strong theoretical and empirical
support has been offered in favor of the hypothesis that the rising profile of male
earnings is a function of labor market experience and investment in human capital,
against the alternative hypothesis that itis merely caused by a maturation process
(see, especially, the theoretical and empirical work of Mincer, particularly his 1970a
paper and 1974b book and the theoretical work of Ben-Porath [19671 and Becker
[1964, 1967]). The relative flatness of married female wage profiles is consistent with
the human-capital interpretation of life-cycle wage rates because of their much lower
levels of lifetime labor-force participation, because their periods of greatest participa-
tion are relatively late in the life cycle after childbearing, and because, with rapid
growth of female labor-force participation across cohorts, cross-section age profiles are
a progressively downward-biased approximation to the life-cycle profile of women of
a given cohort. An interesting piece of evidence supporting this view is Fuchs's (1971)
finding that the wage profile of single (never married) women, who have much
higher participation rates than married women, has a shape closer to that of males
than to that of married females. Whatever its past importance, itis likely that con-
tinued growth in the married female labor-force attachment will make postmarital
investment in human capital of increasing importance in the future.
10 See Lindsay (1971) for further discussion ofa static, lifetime model of human
capital and labor supply.
Michael and Lazear (1971) emphasize this point, the terminology "negative
user cost" instead of learning by doing.
12 The husband's earnings capacity could be similarly discussed. However, since his
34 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
of the wife's lifetime market earnings. Her average market wage, w (de-
fined as equal to her lifetime earnings divided by her lifetime hours of
work) is determined by an earnings (capacity) function of the form
(14)
where K is a shift parameter which is assumed to increase w. The earnings
function may be regarded as a reduced-form equation embodying the
solution to the wife's optimal program of human capital accumulation for
each possible level of her lifetime labor supply, L.° The parameter'c
represents her initial stock of human capital at the outset of marriage
(and an associated exogenous time rate of depreciation on that stock dur-
ing marriage). The dependence of the wife's average wage on her lifetime
labor supply reflects the interaction of the supply and demand for post-
marital investments in human capital. Generally, it may be expected that
3w/aL =WLwill be positive. Thus, the return from any given postmarital
investment which increases the wife's market earnings capacity increases
with the number of hours she plans to work over her lifetime, so that the
larger L is, the more likely investment is to be undertaken and the higher
the wife's average wage will be.1° An additional factor that would tend
to make WL positive is that "learning by doing" forestalls depreciation of
the initial human capital stock or leads to its augmentation.'-' Since the
wife's lifetime labor supply, L, is subject to choice, it follows that her
average wage, w, is an endogenous variable in the model.'2
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The family's capacity to obtain satisfaction from the number and quality
of its children and from S is limited by its consumption technology, its
endowments of wife's time and nonlabor income, and the earnings capacities
of the husband and wife. The constraint on the family's production and
consumption of commodities may be written in implicit form as the pro-
duction-possibility function
çb(NQS,H,K,T)0. (15)
This function may be interpreted as follows. For preassigned levels of the
exogenous variables H,andT and for a preassigned output level of S,
the production-possibility function gives the maximum attainable output of
NQ (=C).
Theassumption that the production-possibility function is the relevant
constraint on family behavior implies that the family allocates its resources
optimally. The family allocates its resources between C and S production
by choosing vectors of wife's time inputs 1*,,) and market goods (x*,.,
x*,) corresponding to a commodity vector (N*, Q*,S*)satisfying (15),
that maximize the output of C for any given output of S. Like a small
economy in a world of many countries, the family need not be self-suffi-
cient. Although commodities N, Q,andS are nontradeable, the family
does "export" the time of the husband and wife to the labor market and,
in return, it "imports" goods from the market at terms of trade determined
by market prices for labor and goods and by earnings capacities of husband
and wife. Thus, the family must also choose the optimal supplies of wifç's
home time, t", and market goods, x", by choosing her optimal lifetime
labor supply, L*.ll Finally, the optimal commodity vector (N*, Q*,
is the one that maximizes the family utility function (8).
It is well known from the principle of duality that the optimal physical
allocation of commodities and factors implies an optimal set of shadow
prices which reflect the marginal opportunity costs of commodities and
factors in consumption and production. The value of the family's real
lifetime consumption or "full wealth," to use Becker's term, evaluated in
terms of shadow prices of commodities is
1= n,NQ +ir3S, (16)
where I is full wealth andand x., are the shadow prices of C and S. In
order to measure real rather than nominal full wealth, S is chosen as the
numeraire commodity and 3t,, its shadow price, is set equal to unity.
The duality between optimal consumption and production of N, Q,andS
and the optimal shadow prices,andis seen readily by noting that
lifetime hours of work are assumed to be exogenous,itfollows that his lifetime
program of accumulation and lifetime income are also exogenous.
'3Recallthat the husband's time is assumed to be unproductive at home, so that
it is "exported" to the labor market at any positive price.36 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
the one-stage process of maximizing utility subject to the production-
possibility function is equivalent to the two-stage process of (1) minimizing
the "expenditure" of full wealth subject to production possibilities and
(2) maximizing utility subject to the (minimum) full wealth constraint.
By considering the optimization process in two stages rather than one, it is
possible to analyze the supply and demand sides of family behavior
separately even though they are determined simultaneously. The linkage
between supply and demand is given by the family's full wealth, I, and the
shadow price of children,In the second stage, the family demands for
N, Q,andS may be derived as functions of I andand in the first stage,
I and ;. may be expressed as functions of the exogenous variables H, ic,
and T. For example, the effect of a change in husband's lifetime income on
fertility may be analyzed by its effect on I andand, in turn, the effect
of these changes in I and It,, on demand for N.
My analysis of the theoretical structurewillfollow this two-stage
scheme. Demand functions for N, Q,andS will then be derived subject to
the full wealth constraint (sec. 2), followed by analysis of the properties
of the production-possibility function and its implications for full wealth
and the opportunity cost of children (sec. 3). In section 4, I examine the
family's desired fertility and wife's lifetime labor supply in full (general)
equilibrium of supply and demand. Finally, the empirical implications of
the model will be considered and some tests of these implications with U.S.
census data reported.
2.Fertility Demand and the Demand for ChildQuality
The family's demand functions for number of children, child quality, and
S may be written as follows:









where the family's full wealth, I, and the shadow price of children, it,, are
treated as parameters and the shadow price of the parents' standard of
living,it,,,is treated as a numeraire and set equal to1. These demand
functions are derived in Part A of the Mathematical Appendix by maximiz-
ing the family utility function (8) subject to its full-wealth constraint
(16).
The first-order conditions for utility maximization in(Al)of the
Mathematical Appendix may be solved for the Lagrange multiplier, to
obtain the marginal equalities
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(21)
Theinterpretation of (21) is that the family equates the ratios of the
marginal utilities of the number of children, quality per child, and parents'
standard of living to its respective marginal costs, where= isthe
marginal cost of an additional child of given quality,= isthe
marginal cost of raising the quality per child given the number of children,
and it,=1is the marginal cost of the parents' standard of living. Thus,
parents not only balance the satisfactions they receive from their children
against those received from allother sources not relatedto children
(satisfactions from 8), but they also must decide whether to augment their
satisfaction from children at the "extensive" margin by having another
child or at the "intensive" margin by adding to the quality of a given
number of children.
Because of the multiplicative relationship between the number and
quality of children, there are interesting differences between the properties
of the demand functions for N and Qandthe properties of more con-
ventional demand functions in which the commodities enter the budget
constraint additively.14 Let the wealth elasticities e-', andbe de-
fined as the percentage change in N, Q,C,or S demanded per percentage
increase in I, holding it,.constant.In the Mathematical Appendix, it is
shown that
++ (1 —a)ea=1 (Al)
and
4,=+ (AS)
where a = iteNQ/J is the share of I devoted to children. Becker (1960)
speculated that all of these wealth elasticities are positive but that the
quality elasticity,is likely to be substantially larger than the quantity
elasticity, because high-income families are observed to have only
slightly larger or even smaller numbers of children than low-income
families, but they tend to spend much more on each child. This conjecture,
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14 The discussion here will focus on the "observed" wealth and price elasticities of
demand for N, Q, and S as distinguished from the "true" elasticities discussed herein
by Becker and Lewis. The difference between the observed and true elasticities stems
from the measure of wealth implied by the multiplicative model and the conventional
measure implied by an additive model. To take the simplest case, suppose children
are the only source of wealth, so that Iit,,NQ. Conventionally, a doubling of N and
Q would be said to double full wealth and the wealth elasticities of N and Q would
each be equal to unity. However, in order to double N and Q, I must be quadrupled
so that the equiproportionate increase in N and Q resulting from a quadrupling of I
results in observed wealth elasticities of one-half. I am grateful to Becker and Lewis
for permitting me to see their notes on quality-quantity models and for helpful
discussions which have greatly improved the treatment of quality and quantity in
this paper. Any errors remaining are mine.THEORY OF FERTILITY BE
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he pointed out, is also consistent with evidence that the quality elasticity of
demand for consumer durables, such as automobiles, is generally found to
be substantially higher than the quantity elasticity.
A theoretical basis for substantial differences in quality and quantity
elasticities, given some propensity for tastes to be biased toward N or Q,
lies in the fact that relative costs of N and Q do not remain constant when
is held constant unless N and Q change equiproportionately. Thus, the
relative marginal costs of N and Q are PN/PQ = = Q/N.Assum-
ing tastes are biased relatively toward Q, increases in 1willtend to increase
Q/N, thereby increasing the cost of numbers relative to quality of children,
which induces a substitution effect toward Q and away from N. This is
illustrated in figure 1, in which the initial equilibrium in the (N, Q)-plane
is achieved at the tangency of the indifference curve, U, and the rectangu-
lar hyperbola, C,, = NQ, at point a. Assume that an increase in income
leads the family to increase its output of C to C1 and that its new choice
of N and Q is to the left of the ray Oad at point c. Had the relative costs
of N and Q remained the same as they were at a, the new equilibrium
point, remaining on the new indifference curve, U,, would be at b rather
than c, with a smaller consumption of Q and a larger consumption of N.
It is even possible, in this case, for the wealth elasticity of number of
children,to be negative without N being, in the conventional sense, an
inferior commodity.
The substitution effects on N and Q caused by changes in holding
utility constant, also differ from those in demand functions derived from
an additive constraint, because the marginal costs of N and Q, P.v =
and PQ = cannot be varied independently.
In the Mathematical Appendix, itis shown in equation (A14) that
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substitution elasticities of N, Q,andCwithrespect to It is possible,
therefore, for an increase into increase either N or Qbutnot both. In
equations (A19)—(A21) it is shown thatand T1Q may be expressed as





where T1NN and 1QQ are own-substitution elasticities which measure the
percentage change in N (or Q)causedby a given percentage change in
PN (or holdingutility,(or PH), and Pa constant and where 11.vQ =
are cross-substitution elasticities which measure the percentage change
in N (or Q)causedby a given percentage change in (or PH), also
holding utility and the other prices constant. As 11NQ is positive or negative,
N and Qaresaid to be substitutes or complements.
The signs of anddepend on whether N and Qaresubstitutes or
complements and, if they are substitutes, on the relative magnitudes of the
negative own effects, and 1QQ, and the positive cross effect,INQ.Since
the issues to be resolved in order to derive hypotheses about the signs of
anddepend on the nature of family tastes, economic theory as such
has little to say. Some clues, however, may be found by judging the impli-
cations of alternative assumptions about TheN, and for the relation-
ships among N, Q,andS in terms of their sociological and intuitive
plausibility.
For example, if N and Qarecomplements, both and would be
negative. This would imply that an increase init,. would reduce both N
and Qandwould increase S. This implication would be objectionable to
those persons including Duesenberry (1960) and Blake (1968) who have
argued that parents either cannot or will not choose child quality inde-
pendently of their own standard of living. They argue, in effect, that Q
andS should usually move in the same direction. The thrtist of this
argument may be accommodated by assuming that N and Qaresubstitutes
and that and TINQ are roughly equal in absolute magnitude so that 11Q
is near zero or even positive, which would imply, of course, that is
negative. This also implies that substitution in consumption between N
and S is easier than between QandS and, indeed, that QandS are comple-
ments ifis positive. This also seems consistent with the sociological
argument.1° These sociological considerations suggest the hypotheses that
Thy is negative and thatis small in magnitude and possibly positive.
15 This result was first proved by Theil (1952).
16 The following relationships hold between own elasticities and cross-elasticities of
N with Q and S and of QwithN and S:
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There is also an interesting implication of this analysis for the demo-
graphic impact of changes in the cost of fertility control. Willis (1971)
shows that the (shadow) marginal cost of fertility control, itt, defined as
the additional fertility-control cost incurred per birth averted, acts as a
per unit subsidy to childbearing. That is, a couple may reduce their
fertility control costs by it, by having an additional birth so that the full
marginal cost of an additional child becomes PN = —it1.This implies
that a decrease in it1 caused by, say, an improvement in birth control
technology will increase PN, leaving andPs unaffected. Thus, the effect
of a change in it1 is
— 8PN
3it1 Tht1
which,in elasticity form, is
I
iN! = —iNN\it.Q-.--it1
If 'lNQ is positive andis negative, it follows thatlisxj > sothat
a given percentage increase in p.vcausedby an improvement in fertility
control will cause a larger decrease in fertility than an equal change caused
by an increase inMoreover, the effect of a given decrease in it1 will be
larger the smaller is. While this may suggest that the demographic
impact of improved birth control technology would be greatest among low-
income groups, such a conclusion is unwarranted until it is known how the
change in technology affects it1 in different income groups. It is beyond
my scope here to explore the determinants of fertility-control costs which
doubtless include a large element of psychic cost in addition to costs in
time and money. Thus, for present purposes, let us revert to our former
assumption of perfect and costless fertility control.
The results of the preceding analysis of the demand side of the theo-
retical model of fertility behavior suggest the hypothesis that the observed
wealth elasticity of demand for the number of children, cv, is likely to be
small and possibly negative even though N is not an inferior commodity in
the conventional sense. The other main hypothesis, which resulted from a
Y(miy+riNQ)+ (1—y) I1NS=0,
+ liQy)+(1— y) 0,
wherey isthe share offullwealth devoted to children and and are,
respectively, the cross-elasticities of N and Q with respect to p.s. and p0. Assume that
=+1Q.V=0. It follows that must also equal zero, indicating that there
is no substitutability between Q and S. Ifis positive, it follows that Q and S are
complements, since must then be positive. Since, in either of these cases,=
1NN + must be negative, it follows that ispositive, so that N and S are
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combination of economic analysis and sociological considerations, is that
the compensated effect of an increase inthe opportunity cost of child
services in terms of parents' standard of living, will tend to reduce fertility
so that uN is expected to be negative. The next step is to analyze the supply
side of the model in order to derive the relationship between I and it,. and
the exogenous variables H, K,andT.
3.The Supply of Child Services and the Allocation of Time
The family's capacity to produce and consume N, Q,andS is given by its
production-possibility function (eq. [15]). If (15)is the effective con-
straint on family behavior, the implication is that the supplies of wife's
home time and market goods are allocated efficiently between the produc-
tion of C (=NQ) and S, and that, through the family's choice of the level
of the wife's lifetime labor supply, an optimal mix of the supplies of time
and goods is achieved.
The duality between optimal allocation of resources and optimal shadow
prices may be exploited to facilitate the analysis of the production-possi-
bility function. It was noted earlier that the family may be considered to
minimize the cost of its consumption by minimizing its "expenditures" of
full wealth subject to the constraint of its production-possibilities function.
The condition for minimum cost is
—-- == =
where isthe opportunity cost of an additional unit of C in
terms of the amount of S foregone, is the marginal rate of trans-
formation along the production-possibility function, and =it,. is equal
to the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between S and C.
Efficient allocation of family resources depends on the fulfillment of
certain marginal productivity conditions. Because the production functions
for C and 5, (6) and (7), are assumed to be linearly homogeneous func-
tions of inputs of wife's time and market goods, the marginal products of
these two factors are functions solely of the input ratios or time intensities,
Pc= and=t,/x,,.Thus, (6) and (7) may be written as C =
X,F(p,.)and S = where their first derivatives, F' and G', are
positive and their second derivatives, F" and C" are negative, indicating
that the marginal product of wife's time is positive but diminishing.
Production within the home will be optimized when the value of the
marginal product (VMP) of each factor is equal to its shadow price and
when the ratio of the marginal products of the two factors in the produc-
tion of each commodity is equal to the ratio of shadow factor prices. These
conditions permit the addition of three equations to the model. The shadow
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price of the wife's time is equal to the VMP of her time in the production
of C and S:
A , , w == G;
(23)
and the ratios of the marginal products of time and goods are equal to
the ratio of the shadow factor prices,
W A F' G' = w = =
where S is taken to be the numeraire commodity, so that=1,and the
market and shadow prices of market goods, pandarealso set equal to
Sinceat., == p = 1,the family's full wealth and the opportunity
cost of children, itt., are measured in dollars of constant purchasing power
and the wife's shadow price of time,is measured in dollars per hour, the
same unit in which her market wage is measured. The wife's price of time,
playsa central role in the allocation of her time between home and
market, in the allocation of resources within the home, and through its
relationship within the division of consumption among the number of
children, child quality, and other sources of satisfaction.
The linkage betweenandis provided by the famous Stolper-Samuel-
son theorem, which states that there will be a one-to-one monotonic corres-
pondence between factor and commodity prices in a two-factor (time and
goods), two-commodity (children and standard of living) general-equi-
librium system if the following conditions are met:(a) the commodity
production functions are linearly homogeneous, (b) the factor intensities
(factor-input ratios) of the two commodities differ, and (c)thesign of the
factor-intensity ordering is invariant over all possible values of the f actor-
price ratio (see Stolper and Sarnuelson 1941). If condition (c)failsto hold
and there exist so-called factor-intensity reversals, the monotonicity of the
correspondence between factor and product prices will be destroyed. In
this case, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem will hold locally, with the sign
of the change in factor prices caused by a change in product prices (or
vice versa) depending on the difference in factor intensities prevailing in
that locality.17
In terms of the present model, (a) has already been assumed to be true
and (c)willbe satisfied if for all possible values ofTheStolper-
Samuelson theorem implies that the elasticity ofwith respect tois
17 See Samuelson (1949) for a discussion of factor-intensity reversals.
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A A A e =k1 [(Pc— P8)/Pc], where + PXc)is the share of wife s
time cost in the total cost of children and (Pc—ps)/pc isthe percentage
difference in the time intensities of C and S.'8 Since it is the product of
two terms, each smaller than 1 in absolute value, emustalso be smaller
than unity in absolute value. On the basis of evidence cited later, it is
assumed that children are more time intensive than S (i.e.,pc > ps),sothat
is positive and increases inwill tend to increase
The relationships between factor intensities,Pc andand the shadow
factor and commodity prices, i2'andits,maybe illustrated by a diagram
introduced by Samuelson (1949). In the left panel of figure 2, the "substi-
tution curve," CC, plots the locus of points satisfying i2 = F'/(F—
in (24). Curve CC slopes downward because, as the wife's price of time
rises, the family switches to progressively less time-intensive methods of
producing C, so thatfalls asincreases. The elasticity of CC is equal to
the elasticity of substitution of the C production function. If time and
goods must be used in fixed proportion=0), CC is vertical; ift,, and
x,, are perfect substitutes= co), CC is horizontal; and if they are
imperfect substitutes (0 < ci,, < CCwill slope downward as drawn.'°
18 This elasticity is derived by forminga simultaneous system from (22)—(24) in
which it,,,and p8 are endogenous andis treated as exogenous. Totally differentiat-
ing this system, the solution
is obtained, which is written in elasticity form in the text.
19 It should be emphasized that t,, is the wife's own time and that purchased time
such as that of a component of purchased market goods, x,. Since
CCisnot horizontal, it is implied that purchased time is an imperfect substitute for a44 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
A similar substitution curve for S production, satisfying f2'= G'/(G—
p8G')in (24), is indicated by the curve SS. It is everywhere drawn to the
left of CC to conform to the assumption that children are more time
intensive than S, and its elasticity is equal to 08.Thediagram is completed
with the Stolper-Samuelson relationship, drawn as the inelastic, positively
sloped curve, in the right panel of figure 2. It slopes upward because
of the assumption that po > Since(24) requires thatbe equal in C
and S production, it can be seen that each level of the price of time (e.g.,
corresponds to a pair of optimal time intensities [e.g., (pc)oand(p8)0]
andto a given value of the opportunity cost of children [e.g.,
The allocation of the wife's time between home production (t = t0 +t8)
and market work (L = T —t)depends on the opportunity cost of an
additional hour of market work in terms of the value of home production
foregone. Assume, for the moment, that the wife may work any number
of hours during marriage at a constant wage rate, w',andthat her price of
time when she does no market work (L = 0) isin figure 2. If w'
it will be optimal for the wife to supply no market labor, because the dollar
value of commodity production sacrificed by withdrawing an hour of her
time from direct input into home production exceeds the gain from the
added goods input obtained from her additional market earnings. If w'>
optimality requires that she supply labor to the market until Pcand
are reduced sufficiently to raise her price of time at home to equality with
her market wage. Thus, the weak inequality
A , (25)
may be added to the model.
It was argued earlier that the wife's lifetime market earnings capacity
depends on her initial stock of human capital at the outset of marriage, ac,
and on the additional human capital she accumulates during marriage
through postmarital investment, which, in turn, is an increasing function
of her lifetime labor supply, L, so that her lifetime earnings are wL =
w(L, ,c) L, where w is her average lifetime wage and w(L, x) is her earn-
ings (capacity) function specified in (14). The value of an additional hour
of work during marriage, which is called the marginal wage rate, w', is given
by the first derivative of wL with respect to L as follows:
wife's time in raising children. It should also be pointed out thatthe share of wife's
time in the total cost of children, will increase withif< 1, will decrease if
1, and will remain constant if= 1. Analogous remarks also pertain to S production.
20 Time-intensityreversals,which would disrupt the one-to-one correspondence
between a,, andandchange the sign of e, may be visualized in fig.1 by imagining
CC and SS to intersect at one or more points. Given that p0 >at, say, the median
level of Iii in a population, the likelihood of a reversal depends on the magnitude of
p,, —p8,the difference between 0,, and andthe range of variation ofin the
population. If there is one reversal (intersection), it will occur below the median
if 0,, <08andabove the median if> will be negatively related tofor
low w in the former case and for sufficiently highin the latter case.
I..
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w=w+WLL, (26)
where WLreflectsthe increased earnings capacity the wife finds it worth-
while to acquire when her lifetime labor supply increases. Since she will
stop investing if increasing costs or diminishing returns are sufficient to
reduce her average wage with further investment, WL must be greater than
or equal to zero.2'
Optimal allocation of time between home and market requires the wife
to adjust her lifetime labor supply so as to equate her price of time,
and her marginal wage, w'. This implies that her price of time will tend to
exceed her average wage and, more importantly, that the price of time will
tend to be an endogenous variable, dependent on the choice of L. The
change in w' with respect to L is w" = 2WL +WLLL,For low levels of the
labor supply, ut' will be positive and w' will be an increasing function of L.
If the average wage has a maximum, however, the marginal wage will reach
a maximum before this point and begin declining while the average is still
rising. Thus, w" may become zero or negative for sufficiently large values
of L.
The production-possibility function (15) is determined by .the simulta-
neous solution of the set of equations embodying the household production
functions for C and S, the time and goods constraints, the wife's earnings
function, and the conditions for efficient allocation of time and goods
within the home and efficient allocation of the wife's time between home
production and market work. Gathering these equations together and re-
numbering them for convenience, we can determine the family's produc-










AA A w=w/p= = (27.8)
21 It is possible for to be negative if physical and mental strain from long hours
of work reduce the average wage associated with a given stock of human capital. Such
positive "user costs" are the converse of the negative user costs stemming from learning




The endogenous variables of the model are: C =outputof child services,
S =outputof all other sources of satisfaction, L =lifetimelabor supply
of wife after marriage, x =totalquantity of market goods, X(. =goodsused
in C, x,, =goodsused in S, p,. = = timegoods ratio in C production,
=t,/x3=timegoods ratio in S production, w =wife'saverage lifetime
market wage, w' =wife'smarginal lifetime market wage,=wife's
shadow price of time or home, wage, and it,. =it,./it8=marginaloppor-
tunity cost or shadow price of child services.
The exogenous variables are: H =thehusband's lifetime income, ic
thewife's stock of human capital at the outset of marriage, and T =the
life-span of the wife after marriage.
The following market and shadow prices are set equal to unity:=
themarket price of goods,=theshadow price of goods, and it8 =the
shadow price of S.
The system (27.1 )—(27.1 1) constitutes a household-level general-equi-
librium system whose properties depend on whether or not the wife works
in the labor market. If she does work (i.e., L > 0), w =win (27.11)
and the general-equilibrium system is composed of 11 equations, (27.1)—
(27.11), in 12 unknowns (C, S, L, x, it,., x,, p.s, w,w',and it,.). Tithe
wife does not work (i.e., L =0),(27.11) becomes the strong inequality
> w' and equations (27.9) and (27.10) become irrelevant. In this case,
the system is composed of eight equations, (27.1)—(27.8), in nine un-
knowns (C, 5, it,it,., p,., andit0). In either case, the number of
unknowns exceeds the number of equations by one. This degree of freedom
represents the scope of family choice: given the family's choice of the
level of C (or S), the level of S (or C) and the equilibrium values of the
other endogenous variables will be determined simultaneously. The system
is closed in the full model by the family's choice of the utility-maximizing
combination of C (=NQ)and S. For now, the system may be closed by
treating S as a parameter in order to focus attention on the supply side
of the model.
The two general-equilibrium systems, (27.1)—(27.11) if the wife works
and (27.1)—(27.8) if she does not work, may be solved for the equilibrium
values of each of the endogenous variables as functions of the exogenous
variables of the system: H,andT if the wife works and H and T if
she does not. The properties of these "reduced form" equations depend
on the properties of the "structural" equations of the general-equilibrium
systems, particularly the properties of the household production functions
for C and S in (27.1) and (27.2) and the earnings-capacity function of
the wife in (27.9).
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Among the reduced-form equations, the most important are the pro-
duction-possibility functions which constrain the family's consumption
possibilities and subject to which the family attempts to maximize its
utility. If the value of the wife's time at home exceeds her marginal market
wage so that she does no market work, the production-possibility function
may be written in implicit form as
C =K(S,H,T) (28)
and will be called the K-type constraint. If the wife's marginal market
wage is sufficient to cause her to enter the labor market, the production-
possibility function may be written in implicit form as
C=J(S,H,ic,T) (29)
and will be called the f-type constraint. Taken together, the K- and I-type
constraints constitute the constraint on household consumption and pro-
duction possibilities over all possible values of the exogenous variables H,
K,andT. The full constraint may be written
(—C+K(S,H,T); so' 0=4(NQ,S,H,tc,T) .(3Q)
(—C+J(S,H,K,T);
The condition for the family to face a K-type constraint (i.e.,> so')
is also the condition for the wife to remain out of the labor force (i.e.,
L =0);conversely, the condition for the family to face a f-type con-
straint (i.e.,=w')is also the condition for the wife to participate in
the labor force (i.e., L > 0). Thus, the properties of the constraint faced
by the family are determined simultaneously with the wife's labor-force
participation decision. Sinceandso' are also endogenous variables, it
follows that the participation decision will be a function of the exogenous
variables H, sc,andT and the family's choice of S (and C).
Let us define the wife's lifetime labor-force participation function as
R =R(S,H,K,T), (31)
where R =0if> so' and R =1if=so'.If the wife is out of the
labor force, her price of time, isdetermined by values of S, H, and T,
and at L =0,the value of her (potential) marginal wage rate, so',is
simply an increasing function of her initial human capital stock, sc.Conse-
quently, for given values of 5, H, and T, the larger Kis,the more likely
it will be that R =1and that the family will face a f-type constraint.
It will be shown shortly thatis an increasing function of H, a decreasing
function of T, and, provided that children are more time intensive than S,
a decreasing function of S. It follows that R is more likely to equal 1 and
that the family is more likely to face a f-type constraint, ceteris paribus,
the smaller H is and the larger T and S are. If R is interpreted as a con-
tinuous cumulative probability function (e.g., 0R1) rather than as
Ia dichotomous step function, this discussion implies the following signs
for the partial derivatives of R: R8 > 0, R11 < 0, R5 > 0, and> 0.
The shape of the production-possibility functionin (30) and the
manner in which its shape and position change when the exogenous varia-
bles H, K,andT change depend on whether the wife participates in the
labor market and, if she dOes work, on whether her marginal market wage
is a constant or varies with her lifetime labor supply because of post-
marital investment in human capital. The slope of 4> at any given point,
3C/3S = —(1/xe), measures the reciprocal of the opportunity cost of
children.22 The shape ofin the neighborhood of a given point depends on
the sign of the second partial derivative,= (l/x0)2/(ax0/aS), which
measures the change in the opportunity cost of children,given a change
in S along the production-possibility curve. As 4>ssisnegative, zero, or
positive, the curve will be concave, linear, or convex to the origin. The
amount by whichshifts, given a change in H, K,orT, is measured by
the first partial derivatives, 4>H, and 4)T,andthe change in its slope
(i.e., the change in by the second partials, 4>SH, 4>Sx, and 4>sr.
These first and second partial derivatives ofare derived in Parts B
and C of the Mathematical Appendix for three forms of the production-
possibility function: (i) the K-type constraint (wife does not work); (ii)
the constraint (wife works at a constant marginal wage, w'); and
(iii) the f-type constraint (wife works and her marginal wage, w', varies
with her lifetime labor supply, L). The shapes of the K-, and f-type
constraints are determined, respectively, by the signs of the second partial
derivatives, K35, f*35, and fas, in (C9), (C14), and (C18) in the Mathe-
matical Appendix. In what follows, these results are interpreted diagram-
matically.
If the wife does not work, the family's total supplies of goods and time
are fixed (i.e., x = H, t=T) and the K-type production-possibility curve
has the conventional "bowed-out" shape of K0a'K0 in figure 3 if it is as-
sumed that the time intensities,and P8, are not equal. The reason for
the bowed-out shape and its connection with the opportunity cost of
children, the wife's price of time, and her labor supply may be explained
with the aid of figure 2.
Since the of K0a'K) at any given point is equal to itcan be
seen that the upper and lower limits ofcorrespond, respectively, to the
slope of the constraint at the maximum output of C and at the maximum
output of S. Let p = t/x = T/H (in fig. 2) be the ratio of the total sup-
plies of time and goods corresponding to the fixed-resource endowment
underlying K0a'K0 in figure 3. Each point on K0a'K0 must satisfy p k,oc
+(1—k)p.,,where k = is the share of goods devoted to children.
The output of C along ranges from zero when k = 0 and p = pa
22Forease of interpretation, the production-possibility curves in fig.3 have been
drawn with Conthe horizontal axis so that their slopes are .3S/.SC=
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to a maximum when k =1and p =If>p,, as is assumed in figure
2, the price of time ranges from a minimum ofwhenp =p,,to a maxi-
mum of w2, when p = becauserelatively more goods and less time are
released from S production than can be reabsorbed in increasing C produc-
tion at existing levels ofandp,. Consequently, both pc andmust fall,
implying thatmust rise as C increases and, because the cost of time is
more important in C than in S, that the opportunity cost of children must
increase as well from a minimum of to a maximum of Had it
been assumed, instead, that<the price of time would decrease as
the output of C increased, butwould still increase because the cost of
goods would be relatively more important in C than in S.
While the hypothesis that children are relatively time intensive has
some intuitive appeal, its most important support is its consistency with
the negative relationship between the number of children in the household
and the labor-force participation rates and hours of work of married
women which has been found in many empirical studies of female labor-
force behavior (e.g., Mincer 1962a; Cain 1966; Bowen and Finegan 1969).
The wife's labor-force participation decision depends on whether her mar-
ginal wage, w', exceeds her price of time,at L = 0. From figure 2, it
can be seen that the wife will never work if w' is less than the lower limit
of the price of time, that she will always do some market work if w'
exceeds the upper limit of the price of time, and that if w' falls within
these limits, the participation decision depends on the value ofimplied
by the family's choice of C and S. If children were assumed to be relatively






would have the lowest participation rates and that, as C increases and
declines, participation rates would rise. Of course, these implications are
counterfactual. If, conversely, children are assumed to be relatively time
intensive, the predicted negative relationship between C (=NQ) and the
wife's labor supply is consistent with the negative relationship between N
and the labor supply if an increase in N is not wholly offset by a decrease
in Q.H
The form of the constraint faced by the family depends on the wife's
labor-force participation decision. If she does participate, the shape of the
f-type constraint depends on the relationship between her marginal market
wage, w',andher lifetime labor supply, L, implied by the properties of her
lifetime earnings function (14) and on the negative relationship between
C and L implied by the assumption that children are relatively time inten-
sive. The family faces a K-type constraint over the full range of its pro-
duction possibilities if the wife's marginal market wage is less than her
minimum price of time corresponding to C = 0 and p = ps; it faces a
or f-type constraint over the full range if w'exceedsher maximumwhen
S = 0 and p =and it faces a mixed constraint if Wmjn <W' <
Two mixed constraints are illustrated in figure 3 by Koa'J*o and K0a'f0,
each of which is tangent to the K-type constraint K0a'K0 at point a'.
Point a' in figure 3 is assumed to correspond to point a in figure 2 so that
the common slope of the three production-possibility curves ata'is
assumed to equal (it5)0 at point a. It is implied from figure 2 that the time/
goods ratios correspond to points a' and are and (p8)0 and that the
wife's price of time is Point a' is a point.of mutual tangency if it is
assumed that point a corresponds to the threshold value of the wife's labor-
force participation function R in (31) such that (i) the wife is not work-
ing (L = 0) and (ii) her price of time is equal to her marginal market
wage
If the family chooses relatively large outputs of C to the right of a',
the price of time rises above w'0,thewife remains out of the labor force,
and the family faces a K-type constraint over the segment a'K0. If it
23Tworesults of recent research on married women's labor supply bear on the
model of thispaper.Leibowitz (1972) hasfoundthat additional young children cause
more highly educated women to withdraw from the labor force more than do women
with less education. One explanation for this might be that the more highly educated
women have children of higher quality, so that a given increase in N causes a larger
increase in C for them than for the less educated women. Smith (1972a), using a
different body of data and a somewhat different empirical technique, was unable to
obtain Leibowitz's result. The second result, obtained by Smith and by Landsberger
(1971), among others,isthat,ceterisparibus, the negativeeffectofadditional
children on the wife's labor supply is attenuated as the children age, becoming possibly
positivefor teen-age children. This suggests the hypothesis that children become
relatively less time intensive as they age, eventually becoming relatively goods inten-
sive. While this hypothesis cannot be incorporated into the static, lifetime framework
of the present model, it was incorporated by Warren Sanderson into a dynamic life-
cycle model of fertility behavior described in Sanderson and Willis (1971).
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chooses relatively small outputs of C to the left of a', the price of time
tends to fall below w'0, which leads the wife to withdraw time from home
production in order to supply labor to the market. If her marginal wage
remains constant at w'0, the opportunity cost of children must also remain
constant at so that the constraint is the linear segment a'J*o in fig-
ure 3. The amount by which a'J*o lies above K0a'K0 and to the left of a'
in figure 3 represents the "gains from trade" to the family from "export-
ing" the wife's time to the labor market in order to "import" additional
market goods.
Postmarital investment in human capital opens the possibility of addi-
tional gains from trade through improvements in the wife's lifetime earn-
ings capacity as illustrated by the "bowed-in" segment of the constraint,
a'J0, to the left of point a' in figure 3. As the output of C decreases to the
left of point a', the wife's optimal labor supply and optimal investment in
human capital both increase, causing w' to rise above w'0. As long as so'
is an increasing function of L (i.e., w" = 2WL + > 0), the price
of time and the opportunity cost of children will decrease as the output
of C increases, causing the f-type constraint to be convex to the origin as it
is in figure 3. At a sufficiently high level of the labor supply, it is possible
that so' will reach a maximum and begin to decrease with further increases
in L (i.e., so"0). In this case, not depicted in figure 3, the f-type con-
straint will have an inflection point and become concave to the origin as C
becomes sufficiently small.
The family's desired levels of fertility, child quality, and the parents'
standard of living depend on the interaction of the family's tastes and on
the constraints that it faces. More precisely, the family's optimal consump-
tion of N, Q,andS and the production of C (=NQ) and S are determined
simultaneously by maximizing utility subject to the production-possibility
constraint. The solution of this household-level general-equilibrium system
implies, simultaneously, solutions for the wife's optimal labor supply and
postmarital investment in human capital and optimal lifetime allocations
of her home time and market goods between C and S production.
The solution of this household-level general-equilibrium system may be
expressed as a set of reduced-form equations relating the optimal quantity
of each of the endogenous variables of the model to the values of the
exogenous variables. This set of equations consists of (1) a set of final
consumption demand functions for N, Q,C(=NQ), and 5, (2) a set of
derived input demand functions for t,t,, x,x,,, andx,,(3)a derived
labor supply function for L, and (4) a threshold function for the wife's
labor-force participation, R. Each of these is a function of the exogenous
variables H,and T.
The hypotheses about family behavior that can be derived from this
model are embodied in the properties of these reduced-form demand and
supply functions. These properties depend, in turn, on the form of the52 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
constraint faced by the family and on the hypotheses about the nature of
the family, its goals, and the capacities of its members which are embedded
in the specification of the utility function, household production functions,
and earnings functions.
According to the model, changesfamily behavior are in response to
changes in the family's lifetime economic circumstances resulting from a
change in the husband's lifetime income, H, the wife's initial stock of
human capital,orher lifespan after marriage, T. Changes in these varia-
bles (1) change the family's full wealth, 1, by shifting the production-
possibility curve, (2)changethe opportunity cost of children, by
changing its slope, and (3)if the wife's labor-force status is altered,
change the form of the constraint the family faces from a K- to a or
I-type constraint or vice versa. It follows that the effect of a change in a
given exogenous variable on each endogenous variable may be resolved
into the sum of a wealth effect caused by a change in I and a substitution
effect caused by a change inThe effect of changes in the exogenous
variables on I anddepends on the form of the production-possibility
function in the neighborhood of the initial equilibrium. Because of this,
the form of the demand and supply functions depends on the value of the
wife's labor-force participation function, R, which determines whether the
family faces a K-type or aor I-type constraint. Since R is also deter-
mined by the values of the exogenous variables, the participation function
is an integral part of the demand and supply functions.
In the next section, the empirical hypotheses for family fertility be-
havior implied by the model will be developed in detail. The same line
of analysis may also be used to obtain the empirical implications of the
model for other aspects of family behavior, such as the demand for child
quality or the derived demand for time or goods inputs to children.
4.Desired Fertility and Wife's Labor-Force Participation
The theoretical model of family behavior presented in this paper implies




where N° is the family's demand function for number of children if the
wife does not work (R =0)and the family faces a K-type demand func-
tion; N' is the fertility demand function if the wife does work (R =1)
and the family faces a J- or constraint; and R is the wife's labor-
force participation function in which the demand function for S under a
K-type constraint, S°(H, T), has been substituted for S in (31). Before
I
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the properties of N°, N1, and R are investigated, (32) will be reformulated
more suitably for empirical purposes.
Although the theoretical model has concentrated on a single hypothetical
family, its empirical implications must be tested with data on a population
of families. This population may be considered to be made up of a mix-
ture of families, some proportion of whom face a or I-type constraint
and the remaining proportion of whom face a K-type constraint. Since the
demand relationships, N1 and iV°, between fertility and measures of H, ic,
andT are expected to differ in the two groups because of differences in
the properties of the I- orand K-type constraints, it may seem tempt-
ing to test for these differences by comparing the estimated relationships
from a sample of families containing nonworking wives with those from a
sample containing working wives.
Unfortunately, this straightforward procedure is valid only under the
highly implausible assumptions that each family has identical tastes and
consumption technology, that each wife has an identical earnings func-
tion, and that there are no accidental births. Otherwise, the sampling
procedure tends to select families by their tastes for children, contraceptive
efficacy, and so on because, ceteris pan bus, those women who have more
children are also less likely to work. Moreover, since the labor-force par-
ticipation function, R, in (32) is a function of Fl,andT, the degree of
selectivity will depend on which portion of (H, K,T)-spaceis being con-
sidered. For example, women with high potential market wage rates (high
levels of K)maywork even though their families desire more children
than the average family in the same circumstances, while women with
lower Kandthe same strong taste for children do not work. Thus, the
proportion of families with above-average tastes for children in the sample
containing working wives will tend to be positively correlated with K,
cetenispanibus, even though the taste for children is uncorrelated with K
inthe population as a whole.
An alternative approach is to consider the form of the relationship be-
tween N and the exogenous variables H,andT that would be expected
on the basis of the model of individual fertility behavior in (32) if the
relationship were estimated with data on a sample of families containing
both working and nonworking wives. Again, the sample population may be
considered to contain a mixture of families, of which some proportion faces
aor f-type constraint and the remaining proportion faces a K-type
constraint. The proportion of the two groups in the population as whole
are, respectively, R and l-R, where R, the percentage of working wives
in the population, may be called the average lifetime labor-force participa-
tion rate of married women. Since R varies with H, K,andT, the propor-
tions of the mixture of demand functions of each type (N° and N1) will
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the general fertility demand function may be written as a mixture of the
two special demand functions as follows:
N = T)=RN1(H,K,T)+(1—R)N°(H, T) +u,(33)
where RR(S°[H, H, K,T)is the conditional mean of wives' labor-
force participation rates given the values of H, K,2ndT, and u is an error
term. It is assumed that variations in the parameters of the structural
equations of the model (such as the utility function or household produc-
tion functions) among families in the population are such that u is nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and constant variance and is independent
of the exogenous variables. If this assumption can be maintained, the
"mixture model" in(33) may be used to test the implications of the
theoretical model.
The implications of the mixture model depend on the signs of the partial
derivatives of its constituent functions: the two demand functions, N°
and N1, and the labor-force participation function, R. The partial deriva-
tives of the demand function are derived rigorously in Part D of the
Mathematical Appendix, where it is shown in equation (D22) that these
partial derivatives (in elasticity form) may be decomposed into the sum
of substitution and wealth effects as follows:
+ iH,T,
where N with respect to the ith exogenous variable:
is the compensated elasticity of N with respect to 3te;e, is the elasticity
of x, with respect to the ith exogenous variable, given the form of the
constraint;is the wealth elasticity of N; and y, is the elasticity of full
wealth with respect to the ith exogenous variable.24 In section 2, it was
argued that TIN is negative and the eNmaybe either positive or negative
but, in either case, it is likely to be small in magnitude. For convenience
in exposition, it will be assumed that6Nispositive. The sign ofunder
each form of the constraint and the derivatives of R will be discussed
below.
Assume that the wife is not working, so that the family faces a K-type
constraint such as K0c'K0 in figure 3 and that its initial equilibrium level
of number and quality of children and S correspond to the output of C
and S at point a'. Because the wife's initial (and postmarital) stock of
human capital is assumed to leave her home productivity unaffected, varia-
tions in Kdonot affect the K-type constraint and, therefore, do not affect
desired fertility.25
24 The signs of the compensated substitution elasticities for N, 0, C, and S with
respect to each exogenous variable under each type constraint are tabulated in table
Al in the Mathematical Appendix.
25 This assumption is an obvious candidate for relaxation. From an analytical stand-
point, the simplest way to do so is to assume that increases in human capital increase
I
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From an analytical stand-
ses in human capital increase
An increase in the husband's lifetime income, H, increases the family's
supply of goods (x = H) but leaves the supply of wife's time unaffected
(t = T), while in T, the wife's life-span after marriage, increases the
supply of time without affecting the supply of goods. An important property
of the K-type constraint is that an increase in the supply of goods (time)
will tend to raise (lower) the opportunity cost of children unless the output
of C (S)falls absolutely by a sufficient amount. This property, often
called Rybczynski's theorem, follows from the assumption that>
It is illustrated for the case of an increase in the supply of goods caused by
an increase in H in figure 3 by the asymmetric outward shift in the K-type
constraint from K0a'K0 to K1a"K1, where the slopes of the two curves at
points a' and a" are equal and the output of C at a" is smaller than the
output of C at a'.
Unless C is sufficiently inferior in consumption (i.e., unless the wealth
elasticity of C, issufficiently negative), the new equilibrium point on
K1a"K1 must be to the right of point a" and the slope of the constraint at
the new equilibrium must be steeper than it was at the initial equilibrium
at a' on K0a'K0. Since the slope of the constraint equals —it,, it follows
that an increase in H increases both full wealth, I, and the opportunity cost
of children, it,,. Consequently, the wealth effect in favor of fertility is offset
by a substitution effect against fertility when the wife does not work so
that N°,1, the partial derivative of N° with respect to H, may be either
positive or negative. Since the effect of an increase in T is to reduce itc,
N°T is unambiguously positive.
If the wife works at a constant marginal wage and the family faces
a constraint, an increase in H or T simply shifts the constraint out
without changing its slope, because the wife adjusts her labor supply in
order to keep her price of time,frombecoming unequal to her marginal
wage, w'. In this case, H and T cause no substitution effects, so that N1H
and N1T are positive because the wealth elasticity, EN, is assumed to be
positive. An increase in H causes the wife to reduce her labor supply and
an increase in T causes her to increase L. If w'isan increasing function of
L and the family faces a f-type constraint, it follows that w' and will
fall as H increases and rise as T increases. In this case, the substitution
the wife's productivity neutrally, raising the marginal products of time and goods
equally in both C and S production. In this case, because iiiis equal to the ratio of
the marginal products in each activity,andwould be invariant with respect to
e. An increase inicwouldsimply shift any of the types of production-possibility func-
tions out homothetically, thereby increasing full wealth and causing wealth effects on
consumption. An endless variety of nonneutral effects could be posited which would
also affect andiii in any direction desired. Unless a theory of "bias" is provided,
it is not clear that the undoubtedly realistic hypothesis that human capital affects non-
market productivity has any empirically falsifiable implications.
Rybczynski (1955). Jones (1965) has shown that the Rybczynski theorem
and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem bear a dual relationship to one another.56 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
effect reinforces the wealth effect of H so that N'H becomes more positive
and offsets the wealth effect of T and N'T becomes ambiguous in sign. The
substitution effects caused by H and T are of opposite sign when the wife
works and when she does not.27 An increase in the wife's initial stock of
human capital, K,tendsto increase her marginal wage rate, w',and,there-
fore, to increase the opportunity cost of children, causing a substitution
effect against children. Unless her labor supply curve is backward bending,
the increase in a will tend to increase L, which will further increase w' and
jf the family faces a J-type constraint. The increase in Kalsoincreases
full wealth by an amount related to the level of the wife's labor supply. In
general, it will be assumed that the positive wealth effect of a does not
offset the negative substitution effect so that N15 is hypothesized to be
negative.
The effects of H,andT on the labor-force participation rates of wives
are given by the partial derivatives ofin (33). Variation in R depends
on the relative change of the wife's marginal wage rate, we', and her price
of time,bothevaluated at L = 0 (i.e., when she is not working). The
proportion R will increase if w'increases,holdingconstant, or if i2de-
creases, holding w' constant. Since an increase in the wife's initial stock of
human capital, a, increases w', R5 is positive. It was shown earlier that
an increase in H increases ire, when the wife is not working. It follows that
it also increasesso that RH is negative. By the same token, increases in
T decreaseso that is positive.
The empirical implications of the mixture model in (33) follow from the
signs of its partial derivatives with respect to H,andT. For theoretical
reasons, however, the implications of changes in T will not be tested.
Variations in T may be caused by variations either in longevity or in age
at marriage, with the latter being the only source which is of practical
importance. So far, it has been assumed implicitly that age at marriage
is an exogenous variable. Since bearing and rearing children is one of the
principal reasons for marriage, this is an untenable assumption. Thus,
accidental births sometimes hasten marriage, while averting them may
prolong the single state. Moreover, if children are time intensive and time
is cheaper earlier in life, those who wish to have more children will have
an economic (as well as a biological) incentive to marry earlier. Thus, both
accidental births and the taste for children are likely to be negatively cor-
related with age at marriage, which is contrary to the assumption that the
error term, u, is independent of T.
The general form of the mixture model in (33) cannot be estimated.
One way to obtain a function that can be estimated is to take a Taylor
series expansion of (33) about the mean values of H and a and estimate
27 If to'isa decreasing function of L (to" <0), as it might be among working wives
whose optimal labor supplies are large, the substitution effects caused by increases in
H and T become negative and positive, respectively.
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There are no a priori expectations for the signs of the constant term, d0,
or for the coefficients of the first-degree terms, d1 and d2, because each
involves the constant terms of the constituent equations, a0, b0, and c0,
whose signs are not predicted by the theory. The implications of the theory
do, however, lead to a priori expectations of the signs of the second-degree
coefficients, d:3, d4, and d5, as indicated above.
The signs of the coefficients of the squared terms, d4 and d5, and of the
interaction term, d,, reflect the differential impact of variations in H and
Konthe opportunity cost of children between families in which wives work
and families in which wives do not work, together with changes in the pro-
portions of the two types of family caused by variation in H and Konthe
labor-force participation rate of married women. The reason that d1, the
coefficient of Kraisethe participation rate
> 0) and that, among working wives, increases in Kraisethe cost of
children and depress fertility. An increase in H causes wealth effects in
both groups, but it increases x0 among nonworking wives and either lowers58 ROBERTJ. WILLIS
or leaves it unchanged among working wives, so that N1H —N°H,which
measures the algebraic difference between the substitution effects in the
two groups, is positive. The reason that d5, the coefficient of H2, is negative
is that an increase in H reduces participation (RH < 0), reducing the pro-
portion of families in which H causes a negative substitution effect and
increasing the proportion in which it causes a positive substitution effect.
The coefficient of the interaction term, d3, is positive because increases in
H reduce the proportion of families in which K causes a negative substitu-
tion effect (i.e., RHN1K > 0) and because increases in K reduce the pro-
portion of families in which H causes a substitution effect against fertility
(i.e.,(N'H —N°H>0).
The nonlinearity of the mixture model implies that the effects of chang-
ing income and female wage rates on fertility behavior will vary in
strength and even in sign with the prevailing levels of income and wage
rates. This implication is consistent with the apparent ambiguity of the
effect of income on fertility so often noted by students of fertility behavior.
5.EmpiricalResults
The results of an attempt to test the implications of the mixture model
with data on American families from the 1960 census 1/1,000 sample
follow. Unfortunately, of the three second-degree coefficients of the mixture
model in (34), only d3, the coefficient of the interaction term, Hic, may
be estimated unless the theoretical variables, H andcan be measured
empirically up to a linear transformation.28 Given the unavoidable impre-
cision of the definition of the theoretical variables, "husband's lifetime in-
come" and "wife's initial stock of human capital," it is difficult to see how
one might hope to do better empirically than to measure them up to
positive monotonic transformation. Accordingly, the model that will be
estimated is the "interaction model"
N = d*0 + d*1H + d*2K +d*3H,c+&', (35)
in which the variables H2 andareomitted. In general, since the truncated
model in (35) is a misspecification of the full quadratic model, the coeffi-
cients of (35) will not be unbiased estimates of their counterparts in
(34) 29
I8To see this, let H = rn(y), where y is the empirical measure of H and m is a
positive monotonic transformation (i.e.,its first derivative, m', is positive for all y).
Substituting for H in the general fertility demand function, (33), we have N = N
{m(y), e]. The signs of the first partial derivative with respect to y and the second
cross-partial are unchanged by the transformation (N5m' and = NH,,m'), but the
second partialwithrespecttoyisofarbitrarysign(N571 = NHHm' + NHm")
unless m" is zero, in which case m is a linear transformation. The same argument
holds for empirical measures of x.
29 The effect of omitting H2 and x2 causes the estimated interaction coefficient, dm3,
r
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Before the empirical results are discussed, another measurement problem
must be considered. Any empirical measure of H or Kislikely to measure
the "true" variable with a random error. For example, husband's current
income is almost certainly an error-ridden measure of the income variable
relevant to fertility decisions. Childbearing takes place relatively early in
the marital life cycle, and completed fertility and husband's income are
usually observed much later. The income variable relevant to childbearing
decisions presumably involves the• shape and height of the husband's hf e-
cycle income profile as the family expects it to be at the time these decisions
are taken. Since the husband's current income is observed long after these
decisions have been made, it is likely to be a poor measure of the relevant
variable and its regression coefficient a biased estimate (probably toward
zero) of the true coefficient.3°
In an earlier paper, an apparently successful effort was made to alleviate
the problem of errors in variables in estimating the interaction model by
using weighted cell means as observations where the grouping scheme was
chosen in such a way, as, hopefully, to be uncorrelated with the error and
correlated with the true measure of husband's lifetime income (see Sander-
son and Willis 1971, pp. 35—3 7 and n. 1). Here, in a different approach to
the problem, I use estimates, by occupation, of life-cycle earnings func-
tions of males of a form suggested by Mincer (1970a, 1974b) to predict the
income of husbands as a function of their education, labor market ex-
perience, cohort, weeks worked, size of place, and whether or not they
reside in the South.31
Warren Sanderson and I (1971) attempted to test the interaction model
with grouped data from seven independent subsamples consisting of three
successive 10-year cohorts (1896—1925) from the 1960 census and four
successive 5-year cohorts (188 1—1900) from the 1940 census. An interaction
regression of the form in (35) was estimated in each subsample, using
weighted cell means of husband's income and wife's education as measures
of H and K.Ineach of the seven regressions, the coefficient of the. inter-
action term, d*3, was positive and statistically significant and the coeffi-
cients of husband's income and wife's education, d*, and were negative
and significant. Rather surprisingly, the estimated coefficients of the inter-
to be downward biased (d*., < d3 >0). The reason for this is that H and K(mea-
sured by wife's education) are positively correlated, so that the positive effect on
fertility of high levels of H and Kmeasuredbytends to be offset by the negative
effect of high levels of H and ic measured by d4 andThe bias of d*,,, and d59
is not certain.
30SeeTheil (1971, pp. 607—15) for a discussion of the problem of errors in the vari-
ables.
Theseearnings functions were estimated from a pooled sample of married males
age 18—65 from the 1960 census 1/1,1000 sample and from the 1967 Survey of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (SEO). A description, of these regressions and their estimated
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action model appeared to be sufficiently stable across the cohorts of 188 1—
85 to 1916—25 for us to suggest "that it may he possible to apply our model
to the explanation of trends in cohort fertility as well as to the explanation
of cross-section differentials within cohorts" (p. 36).
\%re were surprised, for it would seem to be beyond the scope of the
static theory underlying the interaction model to explain the effect on
cohort fertility trends of the complex dynamic changes that took place in
the American economy in the period 1881—1965, when these women were
born, married, and bore their children. The static theory would appear to
be better suited to the explanation of differential fertility within closely
adjoining cohorts whose historical experience is held more or less constant
by their common years of birth.
In the empirical work reported in this paper, a crude attempt has been
made to see more directly whether the interaction model can help explain
trends in cohort fertility as well as differential fertility within cohorts.
The data consist of a sample of 9,169 white women age 35—64 in 1960,
married once, living with husbands, and living in urban areas at the time
of the 1960 census (see table 1 for summary statistics of sample). These
women, born 1896—1925, are essentially the same women from the 1960
census used in the Sanderson and Willis (1971) regressions just discussed.
A pure trend equation is estimated from the census sample data to
provide a benchmark against which to measure the impact of the economic
variables in the interaction model. Since this trend was first declining and
then rising among the cohorts of 1896—1925, a quadratic trend function
is fitted by regressing wife's cohort and cohort squared (the birth cohort
of 1925 is set equal to zero) on the reported total number of children born
to her. In this regression, reported in line 1 of table 2,thecoefficients of
both the linear and squared terms are positive and statistically significant.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SAMPLE OF URBAN WHITE WOMEN MARRIED ONCE,
LIVING WITH HUSBAND: 1960 CENSUS 1/1,000 SAMPLE
(NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =9,169)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation
Total number of children born 2.2650 1.7780
Cohort (1925 =0) —10.6900 7.43 10
Cohort2 1694840 191.9660
ED 10.5190 2.8990
H(NOW) ($1,000) 6.7651 5.3936
H(40) ($1,000) 4.2929 2.1407
H(NOW) ED 75.1466 75.2934
H(40) ED 47.8497 31.7309
SMSA (1, 2, 3, 4.) 2.6100 1.6130ROBERTJ. WILLIS I
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IThe minimum level of cohort fertility, as computed from the trend equa-
tion, was reached by the cohort of 1906.
Two alternative measures of husband's lifetime income are used in the
estimates of the fertility demand equations. The first, H(NOW) (see table
2) is equal to the husband's reported 1959 income. As already discussed,
H(NOW) is likely to be an error-ridden measure of husband's lifetime
income, particularly since the husbands in the sample range in age from
their early thirties to retirement age. It is used for purposes of comparison
with the alternative measure, H(40), which is the husband's income at age
40 as predicted on the basis of his occupation, education, labor market
experience, cohort, race, residence in the South, and size of urban area
from the life-cycle earnings functions described earlier. In addition to its
econometric advantages, the use of H(40) has the advantage of permitting
the choice of a given point on the life-cycle income profile in order to
provide a comparable measure of income for men whose current ages differ
considerably.32 Both variables have the great disadvantage of being ex post
measures of income, which may provide a distorted measure of the ex ante
expectation of lifetime income on which fertility decisions are based.
The wife's years of schooling, ED, is used to measure K1 her stock of
human capital at the outset of marriage. Although all of the effects of
education except its effect on the market earnings capacity of the wife have
been ruled out by assumption, it is recognized that education may well have
a systematic effect on tastes, efficacy of fertility control, or efficiency in
household production. This should be borne in mind when the regression
results are considered.
The estimates of the interaction model using H(NOW) and 11(40) are
reported, respectively, in lines 2 and 3 of table 2. In each regression, the
variable, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA), has been added
to hold the influence of the size of urban area constant, and the variab)es
"Cohort" and "Cohort2" have been added so that the effect of the economic
variables on cohort fertility trends may be assessed.
The coefficients of husband's income and wife's education, d°':,, and d*2,
are negative, and the coefficients of the interaction term, are positive in
each regression;all coefficients are statistically significant. The absolute
magnitudes of the coefficients involving H(NOW) are considerably smaller
in magnitude and have lower t-ratios than the corresponding coefficients
of the regression involving This result supports the belief that
32 method of grouping used in Sanderson and Willis (1971) and the auxiliary
regression method used here may both be considered as alternative applications of
the method of instrumental variables to the problem of errors in the variables. The
advantage of the latter method over grouping is that it preserves degrees of freedom
and permits the use of a linear combination of a large number of instruments (the
regressors in the earnings function)see Malinvaud (1966, p. 606).
Comparisons between the magnitudes of the coefficients involving the two mea-
sures of H should be adjusted for differences in their 'neans, which are reported in
table 1. Since the mean of H(NOW) is 1.56 time of H(40), the coefficient
-
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NOTE. —High husband'sincome and low husband's inconie refer to points one standard deviation
above and below mean [H(40)], respectively. The same definitions are used for wife's education.
alonger-run, lifetime concept of income is relevant to fertility behavior.
The interaction model helps explain the U-shaped relationship between
fertility and cross-section measures of husband's lifetime income that
emerged in the United States and some European countries after World
\Var The effect of 11(40) on fertility is
=+d*3ED,
where d'15 is negative and d*3 is positive. As the level of wife's education
(ED) surpasses about 12 years of schooling, the sign of the "income effect"
changes from negative to positive. Thus, in populations or subpopulations
in which wife's education levels are low, the effect of income on fertility
tends to be negative, and it becomes positive as these levels grow. For
effect of variations in the level of 11(40) and ED on the elasticities of
fertility with respect to husband's income and wife's education, see table 3.
These elasticities are computed at the sample mean of 11(40) and ED and
at one standard deviation above and below the mean for each variable.
The estimates of d*1, d*2, and d4:1 using individual data across cohorts
are consistent in sign and magnitude with the corresponding estimates
within cohorts reported in Sanderson and Willis (1971) and described
earlier. Despite this, it appears that my suggestion that the interaction
of H(NOW) is 39 percent of the coefficient of H(40) and the coefficient of H(NOW)
ED is 48 percent of the coefficient of H(4o) ED after the appropriate adjustment is
made.
The interaction model also performs quite well with Israeli data, as Ben-Porath
reports in this volume.model may be used to help explain cohort fertility trends is unwarranted,
at least when static ex post measures of the exogenous variables are used.
Ideally, if the interaction model fully explained cohort fertility trends, the
coefficients of the trend terms, "Cohort" and "Cohort2," would fall to
zero. In fact, these coefficients are not substantially changed by the addi-
tion of the economic variables.
6.Conclusion
The restrictions placed on the specification of the individual equations of
the structural model of fertility behavior that I have presented and on the
structure as a whole represent a drastic simplification of the complex inter-
connections among fertility, family formation, and family behavior. Con-
sideration of these restrictions and the manner in which they may be
relaxed or changed suggests that the present model is only one particularly
simple member of a large class of economic models of individual fertility
behavior which share the common framework of the economic theory of the
family. Thus, the static lifetime framework of the present model could be
changed to a dynamic life-cycle framework. The assumptions of (1) perfect
fertility control could be removed in favor of a theory of imperfect fertility
control, (2) exogenous date of marriage and characteristics of marital
partners could be replaced by a theory of marriage, and (3) exogenously
determined efficiency in household production could be relaxed by applying
the theory of investment in human capital to nonmarket efficiency, and so
on. Work under way on a number of such models promises to provide a rich
source of alternative hypotheses about fertility behavior and, simulta-
neously, about many other aspects of family behavior.
Recognition that there are potentially many alternative economic models
of fertility behavior must influence any assessment of the empirical im-
portance of economic variables on fertility as expressed in the present
model. On the basis of evidence presented in this paper, it appears that the
interaction model captures an important empirical regularity in the cross-
section relationship between fertility and measures of husband's income
and wife's education that has become apparent in the emergence of a U-
shaped. relationship between fertility and income which has been observed
in many advanced countries in the past 25 years and which was an in-
cipient relation at the lower levels of income and education prevailing in
earlier periods. This empirical regularity is also consistent with the pre-
dictions of the theoretical model of fertility demand developed in this
paper and must, therefore, be counted as evidence in its favor. To reiterate
the position Ben-Porath has taken in his paper in this volume, caution
must be exercised in accepting the explanation of fertility behavior provided
by this model, because the mechanism by which the empirical regularity
is generated need not correspond exactly or even chiefly to the one posited
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trends is unwarranted, in the theoretical model. If scientific progress consists in large part of the
nous variables areused. process of rejecting hypotheses, it follows that progress will be impeded if
hort fertility trends, the hypotheses are not proposed. It is in this spirit that the hypotheses implied
ohort2," would fall to by the theoretical model of this paper are advanced.
y changed bythe addi-
Mathematical Appendix
A.Derivation and Properties of Demand Functions Subject to Full-Wealth
Constraint
The demand functions for N, Q, and S are derived by maximizing the utility
function (eq. [8]) subject to the full wealth constraint (eq. [16]), where I,
it,., and it8 are treated as parameters. Maximizing the Lagrangian expression,
U(N,Q,S)
where A is a Lagrange multiplier (A < 0), we obtain the following first-order
conditions for a maximum:
UN +Ait,Q=0,
UQ +AxON0,
U8 + Ait8 =0,
,t8NQ +—1 =0.
The quantities of N, Q, and S demanded as functions of the parameters I, itt,
andmay be obtained by solving (Al') simultaneously. These solutions, ex-
pressed in implicit form, are the demand functions for N, Q, S, and C (=NQ)
in equations (17)—(20).
The properties of these demand functions may be obtained by totally differ-
entiating the first-order conditions (Al') to obtain the following set of simulta-
neous linear differential equations written in matrix form:
UNNUNQ +Ait,UNS QitdN —AQ 00
UQN + UQQ UQS Nit,.dQ —AN 00 = idit8
USN USQ it8 dS 0 —A0
I
L dl
Q3t0 it80 dA —NQ —s 1
(A2)
Among the second-order, or sufficient conditions for utility maximization are
A <0, A isthe determinant of the bordered
Hessian matrix on the left in (A2) and and A',;i are the cofactors of
the elements of the principal diagonal.
Holding it3 constant and solving for the differentials dN, dQ, and dS by
Cramer's rule, we obtain
dN =l/A[—A(QA11—NA21)dic3—A41(dl— (A3)
dQ= l/A[—A(—QA12 +NA22)drtc +A42(dI—NQdit3)],(A4)
dS1/A[A(QA13NA23)ditcA4s(dINQditc)],(A5)
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The wealth effects, obtainedbysetting equal to zeroin involve
the cofactors —A.0, and none of the signs of which are restricted by
the second-order conditions. However, the following relationships hold the
weighted sum of the wealth effects equal unity, and (b) the weighted sum of
the wealth effects on N and Q equals the wealth effect on C. In elasticity form,
these two propositions may he expressed as follows:
y(CN + EQ) + (1 —=1, (A7)
+ EQ = (A8)
where y = is the share of full wealth accounted for by expenditures on
children and ci-, are, respectively, the wealth elasticities of demand for
N, Q, S, and C.
The compensated substitution effects are obtained from (A3)—(A6) by eval-
uating the partial derivatives of N, Q, S, and C with respect to itt, holding utility
constant by setting (dl —NQdit,.'iequal to zero. To simplify the interpretation
of these effects, the following right-hand expressions will be substituted for their
left-hand counterparts in (A5) and (A6): QA1:4 — = A33 and
Q2A11 + N2j\..2 —2NQA12= The compensated substitution effects,
written in elasticity form, are
uN = —A21), (A9)
1Q —A52), (AlO)
(Aic,./S) > 0, (All)
< 0. (Al2)
The second-order conditions imply that 11,5 is positive and 11c is negative such
that
(A13)
where y is the share of full wealth devoted to children. Since the signs of
A12 =A21are not restricted by the second-order conditions, the signs of 11N and
are ambiguous. However, they must sum to a negative number, since
51x + 1Q =51c< 0. (A14)
The conditions for both 'lv andto be negative or for one or the other
(but not to be positive may be seen by considering the price effects
embedded in (A9) and (Alo) as if they had been generated by a conventional
linear full wealth constraint, / + /IQQ + p,5S, which is tangent to the
actual nonlinear full wealth constraint, I = + at the initial point of
equilibrium. The prices in the linear constraint are defined as PN = PQ=
jtrN,and
Although, from their definitions, itis apparent that PN and PQ cannot vary
independently, we shall pretend for a moment that they do. Under this pretense,
66
and, since C = .VQ and dC = Qd.V + NdQ,
dC =l/Ap—A(Q2A1+ —
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B.Partial Derivatives o/the K-Type Constraint
The household's production-possibility constraint when the wife does no market
work was obtained by implicitly solving the simultaneous equation system
(27.1)—(27.8)to obtain the K-type constraint C = K(S,H, T). The partial
derivatives of this function may be found by totally differentiating (27.1)—
(2 7.8)toobtainasetofsimultaneouslineardifferentialequationsthat
may be solved for the differential dC as a function of the differentials of
the independent variables. This task is simpler if appropriate substitutions are
made to reduce the number of equations and unknowns to four and if the
production functions are writtenintheir general form, C = and
S = g(t8, xe). The partial derivatives of these functions are then written as
aC/ate =t9C/axr = = g,; aS/ax, = g.; and so on.
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the left side of (A2) remains the same and the right side becomes (—AdPN
—Adp5l)'. The following compensated own-substitution effects, written











SinceA21 = A1.., it is clear that 'lxQ'loxIf N and Qaresubstitutes, i5
positive, and if they are complements, is negative.
In fact, a change inaffects both Pv and P0 so that, for example,
—
— Thtc aRc
Thus, substituting (A15) and (A17) into (A9) and (A16), (Al8) into (AiO),
we have
fiN = "lRN + fiNQ, (A19)
= 11QQ + fiQN, (A20)
where, from (A14),
10 = fiN + 10 = fiNN + 2flNQ + 7]QQ <0. (A21)68 WILLIS
—=0,
g9= 0.
Taking the total differential of (B1)—(B4) and writing the result in matrix form,
we obtain
—1 1i 12 0dC
o—g1 0
o +g11 3tc/12 + g12 dx0








Let the determinant of the 4 X 4 matrix on the left be A and let the cofactor
of its elementbe i)i+i.
Solving (B5) by Cramer's rule, we can give the first partial derivatives of the
K-type constraint as follows:
= K3 = —A21/A =
ac
= KH =l/A(g2A2i + g12A31 —g22A41)=
ac A
= KT = 1/A (g1A21 + g11A31 g21A41)=
Expressing the partialderivatives of the production functions and
g(t,, x8) in terms of simple derivatives of the functions and we
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C.Partial Derivatives of the J-Type Constraint
The production-possibility function when the wife does some market work is
(B5) obtained by solving the simultaneous equation system (27.1)—(27.11). The
solution isthe J-type constraint, which iswritten in implicit form as C =
J(S,H, K,Again, the full system may be reduced by substitution to the
following system of five equations in five unknowns:
(Cl)





(B6) /1//2— =0. (CS)
Thissystem differs from the system (Bl)—(B4' underlying the K-type constraint
2441) = 1/x0, (B7) only in the addition of equation and in the addition of a term involving
the labor supply, L, into the arguments of the production function g.
By totally differentiating the (Cl)—(C5) system, the following system is
obtained: 1A41) (B8)
[—1
/i /2 00 III I
functions x0) and 0 —g1 —g2 0—g1+w'g2 I Idt0 I
ns and we
I I I
onstraintas follows: o x0f11+ g11xci 12 +g12 g11—w'g12 I Idx0 I
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Let the determinant of the matrix on the left in (C6) be B and let the cofactor
of its elementbe l)i+).
It may be observed that the cofactor B-,5 of the element w" is equal to the








Similarly, it follows that
(C8)
where i,j= I,... ,4.
The element w" + is zero if the wife's market wage is indepen-
dent of her lifetime hours of work. In this case, her market wage, so' =W(K), is
a parameter whose value depends solely on her initial stock of human capital, K,
andthe partial derivatives of the J-type constraint depend only on B* and the
Let the f-type constraint in this special case be
C=J*(S,H,K,T). (C9)
The first partial derivatives of J* are
— (ClO)












Let the general producti
where, if the wife works
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familyisassumedto
areifes market wage is indepen-
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stock of human capital,
dependonly on B* and the
(C9)
=JST=—w"(A/B) 0, (C20)
(Cli) 3C='8K = —W'WKL(A/B)K&H +(1+ L)(B*/B) 1*2
äScIx
(C21)
(C12) The sign ofis ambiguous because the term on the left involving K8H is neg-
ative and the term on the right involving is positive.
D.The Derivation and Properties of the Demand Functions for N, Q,andS
Let the general production-possibility constraint faced by the family be
(I)(C, S, H, K,T)0, (Dl)
where, if the wife works in the market,=—NQ+ J(S, H, K,T'),R
and,ifshe does no market work,1' =—NQ+ K(S,H, T),R =0.The
familyisassumedtomaximizetheLagrangianfunctionU(N,Q,S) +
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If the wife's market wage is affected by her lifetime hours of work because of
postmarital investment in human capital (or for any other reason), w" will not
equal zero. In specifying the signs of the following partial derivatives of the
f-type constraint, it will be assumed that w" is positive, as it would tend to be
if postmartial investment provided the major source of dependence between w'
and L, but the results are also relevant to the converse assumption of neg-
ative w".
The partial derivatives of J may be expressed in terms of the partial deriva-
tives of the K- and constraints by utilizing the relationships in (C7)
and (C8), The first partial derivatives of I are identical to those of 1* and will
not be repeated. The second partials of / are
c32C
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The second-order conditions for a maximum require that D <0 andD11,
D22, and D33 > 0, where D is the determinant of the b-ordered Hessian on the
left in (D6) and D11, D92, and D3;1 are the cofactors of the elements of the
principal diagonal. -
Introducingthe dummy argument ci,(i =H,T),we can solve (D6) by
Cramer's rule to obtain the following partial derivatives of the general fertility
demand function, (D3):
(—AD31/D) (D7)
In the conventional manner, the total effect on demand of a change inmay
be expressed as the sum of a compensated substitution effect and a wealth effect.
The compensated substitution effect is obtained where utility is held constant
The ratio is the marginal rate of transformation between S and C
along the production-possibility function, and in equilibrium, it is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution in consumption, Accordingly, in what
follows, let= and= where these magnitudes can be inter-
preted as equilibrium values.
Corresponding to the general maximization problem involving the constraint
and to the particular problems involving the K- and i-type constraints, define,
respectively, a general fertility demand function,
N=N(H,K,T), (D3)
a demand function when the wife does no market work,
N=N°(H,T),R=0, (D4)
and a demand function when the wife does work,
N=N'(H,K,T),R=l. (D5)
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by setting the tota' differential of the utility function equal tozero(i.e.,
dU =UNdN+ UQdQ+ =0).The first-order conditions of (D2) imply
that UN = and= fromwhich it follows, by sub-
stitution into dU, that + + it3dS =0when utility is held con-
stant. The last equation of (Do) is + + jt8dS = Thus,if
we setequal to zero in (D7) to hold utility constant, the compensated sub-
stitution effect is
(D8)
where 3N/8rc4 is understood to be evaluated with utility, instead of(j1)
being held constant. From the analysis of the second partial derivatives of the
production-possibility functions, itis known that= Conse-
quently, by the chain rule, it follows that
3N—aNajt0
where =—A D11/D. Thus,in elasticity terms, the compensated substi-
tution effect on fertility of a change in 1l\•i'isthe product of the compensated
price elasticity of demand for N, and the elasticity ofwith respect to
crc,where
= = (D9)
An equivalent argument may be made with respect to the compensated substi-






In section 3, it was found that< 0 and 118 > 0 and, less certainly, that
11N < 0 and 110 > 0. Given these signs, the signs of compensated substitution
effects will depend on the signs of thewhich in turn will depend on which of
the(H,orT) is being considered and which type of constraint (K,
or I) the family is facing. The signs of these substitution elasticities are tabulated
in table Al.
The wealth effects on fertility are defined as the partial derivatives of N with
respect to holdingconstant. If we set
2
t3cL5
equal to zero in (Di), the wealth effects are
(D14)The change in the family's full wealth, I +
holding prices constant, is
where = it0and Thus,by the chain rule, the wealth




Again,an equivalent argument may be made for the wealth effects on Q, C,
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is the elasticity of full wealth with respect to aj and (Q, andare,
V, Q, C, AND S WITH respectively, the wealth elasticities of demand for fertility, child quality, child
STRAINT services, and other sources of satisfaction. From the first partial derivatives of
the K J* and J-type constraints, it is easily seen that the aresimply




The total effect on consumption of a change inis the sum of the com-
pensated substitution effect and the wealth effect. In elasticity terms, these total
elasticities are
+ ± oN =+ (D22)
+ OQ='IQ€j+ENYt, (D23)
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Officeof Population Research, Princeton University
Let me abuse the invitation to discuss the paper by Robert Willis by
taking the opportunity to unload a few thoughts on the new home econom-
ics and related concerns. Although itis basically presumptuous for an
outsider (even one who was once inside) to try to tell a group of pro-
fessionals what they are really doing or ought to be doing, it may be that
noninvolvement in the rituals and routines of the work in question can
provide a clarity of vision. If the outcome is mere heresy, it can at least
be readily dismissed as the obvious consequence of ignorance.
I think of economics as playing a central and unique role within the
complex of the sciences of behavior—central because its area of expertise
is the calculus of choice, and choice is ubiquitous and ineluctable in all
behavior; unique because its contribution is primarily (maybe exclusively)
a deductive one. I think of the principles of economics as ultimately tauto-
logical derivations from a branch of applied mathematics. These comments
are in no sense denigrating; I perceive demography, which is my lifeblood,
to have the same formal characteristics. No act of an individual or group
is without an economic dimension, although many classes of action have
been underexposed to the risk of an economist's scrutiny because they do
not pass through the marketplace. What goes on in the family is an obvi-
ous case in point. The subject calls for an expansion of the power and
reach of the calculus of choice beyond merely money-valued resources into
the economies of time, energy, emotional commitment, and the like.
So economists have entered the home and declared that children can be
thought of as purchases by parents and that the time the wife spends on
domestic affairs has an opportunity cost. True enough. But to build the
new home economics on a solid foundation, so that the other social scien-
tists interested in the family will be forced to pay attention, it is necessary
to specify those ways in which the purchase of a child is distinctive from
the purchases of those kinds of commodity on which economics has devel-
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home is a peculiarly constrained choice.
I suggest the simple but fundamental proposition that the replacement
of a continually aging citizenry by new recruits is much too important to
the entire body politic to tolerate untrammeled individual choice to hold
sway. On this issue, as on so many others, the society intervenes, in obvi-
ous and in subtle ways, to ensure that the outcome, at least in the aggre-
gate, makes sense on the society's behalf. These constraints on choice are
what sociologists call norms. Just as no act is devoid of economic content,
so no act is devoid of normative content. Norms are not just another
discipline's jargon for tastes and preferences;the distinction is crucial
between them, because the terms point in entirely different research direc-
tions. When tastes and preferences are employed for some purpose more
elevating than circular reasoning, they promote research into the proper-
ties of individuals, whereas norms are properties of organized groups which
individuals pay heed to in their actions to the extent that they have been
successfully socialized into membership in the groups. Nor are norms
arbitrary in their shape: they are institutionalized solutions to pervasive
problems, and if they do not make sense, the group suffers the conse-
quences. Were these norms fixed in time and space, one could readily take
them as given (meaning essentially to forget them), but they vary from
culture to culture, from subculture to subculture, from class to class, and
they vary through time. Only when the time perspective of the economist
is very short can they safely be neglected. So thoroughly are they em-
bedded in our lives that they verge on the invisible, and this is one of
the major sources of their strength. Yet that creates great research diffi-
culties for the sociologist and provokes great impatience in the non-
sociologist. Now no economist would failto take into account various
biological properties which condition behavior, like early dependence or
limited reproductive span. Sociocultural properties play the same kind of
role.
\\Tillis presents a model within a framework of the economic theory of
the family, but he proceeds about this important task by systematically
destroying the idea of a family. The family in its skeleton form consists
of a flow of person-years through time, encompassing the adult lifetime of
one male and one female and the nonadult lifetimes of a varying number of
children (including zero). The members of the family are bound to each
other by contract, with clear specifications, inter cilia, of the directions
and amounts of flows of resources and services from one to another
member. Willis has collapsed time into the instant of initial decision, he
has defined the parents as subjects and the children as objects, he has
denied the members the right to take satisfaction in the satisfaction of
others, he has merged the husband and wife into a single utility function of
the individual type—in short, he has solved the problems of family eco-
T
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nomicsby dissolving the family. To give one specific example: there is no
characteristic of the child save perhaps the requirement of the expenditure
of time as well as other resources that makes the model any different from
one concerned with any other purchase. Willis presents a good list of the
recalcitrant characteristics of fertility behavior, but the job of coping
with those characteristics from an economic standpoint remains undone.
Almost the only concession to the family as a concept—and that regret-
tably an unwittingly sexist position—is to assign the husband to the labor
force full time and permit the wife to be assigned to the labor force some
proportion of time (from 0 to 1).
I am incompetent to evaluate the merits of the economic model Willis
presents, but I feel less abashed by that circumstance than would ordi-
narily be the case because, as I have suggested, I cannot perceive its special
relevance for fertility. But there are some empirical results, and they
suggest some observations. Willis examines the determinants of parity for
white women age 35—64, married once, husband present, in urban areas
in 1960. Why each of these implicit choices was made is unexplained. It
seems regrettable to destroy variance by restricting the examination to
urban whites; the use of an age limit as low as 35 unfortunately reduces
variance still further (because, although fertility beyond age 35 is small
in toto, it bulks large as a source of differentials) : many interesting kinds
of families get short shrift by the restriction to stable unions: and the
particular epoch of our history associated with these cohorts is the trough
of a cycle, so that the relationships observed may be quite different from
observations around a peak or observations independent of cycle altogether.
Willis presents his regression equation in the following form: P =
4.83269—0.24386*!—0.l7572*E+0.02023*E*I—0.07243°S,where P
is parity, I is estimated income of husband at age 40, E is education of
wife, and S is the size of urban area of residence. This may be reformu-
lated by assigning S its mean value and subsuming it in the constant term
(Willis gives us no reason to be interested in S) and by dividing the coeffi-
cients of E and I by the coefficient of Collecting terms and doing a little
rounding, I obtain P =2.5+0.02*(8.7—J)*(12.3—E).The mean of I,
which is in thousands of dollars, is 4.3; the mean of E, which is in years
of schooling completed, is10.5. The rephrased regression suggests the
presence of threshold values for income and education: it also leads into
a favorite theme of some sociologists, that of status inconsistency, since
the low parities are produced by combinations of high income and low
education, on the one hand, and low income and high education, on the
other. The reformulated regression indicates the way in which the partial
of P with respect to I depends on E and the partial of P with respect to E
depends on!.
The cluster of relationships which leads Willis to his regression are:
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crealwhich occur bwife and inversely with the income of husband: for the working woman,
fertility varies inversely with education of wife;for the nonworking
woman, fertility varies inverse'y with income of husband. Implicit is the
empirical tendency for the education of wife to vary directly with the
income of husband. The only one of these relationships with which I find
any difficulty is the inverse relationship of fertility with husband's income
for the nonworking woman. I suggest that a more plausible version would
be that fertility varies inversely with wife's education for the nonworking
woman. The point is that I believe the alternative opportunity cost of
children rises with the wife's education, whether she is thinking of market
or nonmarket pursuits. I recognize that Willis intended her education as
a surrogate for her lifetime earning capacity, but the data are blind to the
concepts of the theorist, and wife's education means whatever it means,
which to me is a lot more than merely earning capacity. Similarly, the
dependent variable, completed (or nearly completed) parity, is presumably
thought of as a consequence of the initial game plan, I think the results
of a generation of fertility research suggest that variations in parity are
more likely to reflect variations in the efficacy of fertility regulation than
variations in intention. The use of a regression equation to estimate hus-
band's income at age 40 is an interesting innovation. Unfortunately, it
has the consequence of erasing from the system one kind of income vari-
able which has been found to affect fertility, that is, the deviation of one's
income from what would be expected on the basis of one's occupation,
education, and so forth.
Were I designing research on fertility, from an economic standpoint, I
think it would be advisable to consider the aspects of the reproductive
process which are most clearly discretionary. One of these is the age of
the wife (and husband) at birth of the first child. More precisely, that
should be the age at birth of the first intended child. There is substantial
variance in this. It would appear to be related in obvious ways to current
and prospective income, as well as to the education of the wife and her
work history, and it is of extraordinary importance demographically (in
terms of its consequences for variations in the birth rate, in the short run,
and for variations in the ultimate size of the population, in the long run).
A second focus would be the decision as to whether or not to have a third
child. On that decision hangs the balance between growth or decline in
population size. Such was the central concern of the Princeton Fertility
Study, by Westoff and others. The yield from their economic inputs was
meager, but their staff did not include an economist. A third suggestion is
examination of the temporal interdependency of the work history and the
procreative history of the wife, because of its potential bearing on the
initiation and termination of childbearing as well as on the length of birth
interval. Again, it is important to distinguish carefully those acts of pro-
creat 'on which occur by design from those which occur by accident (and
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are accordingly presumably the focus for another kind of model alto-
gether). The finaldiscretionary point which may deserve increasing
attention in the future, although it has largely been proscribed in the
past, is the decision as to whether to have children at all (and quite apart
from whether or not marriage occurs). The proportion voluntarily infertile
seems now to be rising, and the norms defining women's roles are under
concerted attack.
While I would be reluctant to dissuade Willis and others from attempts
at model building such as the present one—since I work in a theoretically
impoverished area and regret it—it does seem to me that some redirection
of energies is requisite to the further development of the economic theory
of fertility. What seems most needed is information, collected according to
the specifications of economists, about the behavior with which their models
purport to be concerned. Demographers survived for centuries on official
registration and enumeration data, but only in the last few decades
have they faced the realization that they have to create their own data to
test their own theories. In my judgment, the economic theory of fertility is
too important to rely on secondhand data, devised for other purposes, from
the U.S. census, or even from our National Fertility Study.
Gary S. Becke
Universityof Chicago